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ABSTRACT 
 
Impact of bundled payment system change  
on average length of stay among surgical patients 
 
- From Diagnosis Related Group to Korean Diagnosis Procedure Combination 
 
 
Background: Since the introduction of the National Health Insurance (NHI) in 1977, Fee-For-
Service (FFS) has been the primary payment system for medical services and supplies in Korea. A 
new payment system, the Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) system, was officially introduced in 2002 
for seven principal diagnoses to providers on a voluntary basis. Since July 2012, all public hospitals 
(39 medical institutions) have been participating in the Korean Diagnosis Procedure Combination 
(KDPC) payment system for 550 principal DRGs. 
 
Objectives: The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of the change in payment systems 
from DRG to KDPC on the average length of stay (LOS) for surgical diagnoses. This study aimed to 
compare these two bundled payment systems and provide evidence for the development of a proper 
reimbursement system. 
 
Methods: NHI claim data was used. Hospitals that consistently participated in the DRG payment 
system from January 2007 to June 2012 and the KDPC payment system from July 2012 to June 2014 
were defined as case hospitals. Hospitals that consistently participated in the DRG payment system 
from January 2007 to June 2014 were defined as control hospitals. We conducted 1:2 sampling using 
ii 
 
the propensity score matching method for age, sex, Charlson Comorbidity Index (CCI), sub-DRG, and 
admission date (month). A total of 36,240 case admissions and 72,480 control admissions were 
included in the analysis. Segmented regression analysis of interrupted time series between cases and 
controls was conducted. 
 
Results: LOS increased by 0.025 days per month (p = 0.0055) for three surgical diagnosis-related 
admissions due to the bundled payment system change. The difference in LOS between cases and 
controls was not statistically significant 12 and 24 months after the change (12 months: difference = 
0.162, p = 0.4210; 24 months: difference = 0.465, p = 0.1052). LOS among emergency admissions 
also increased and showed an increasing tendency under the KDRG. For appendectomy admissions 
(G08), the difference trend in LOS between cases and controls was an increase of 0.015 days per 
month (p = 0.0033) after KDPC implementation compared with before implementation. For hernia 
procedures, the difference trend in LOS between cases and controls was an increase of 0.040 days per 
month (p = 0.0058) compared with before implementation. For hemorrhoid procedures, no significant 
change in LOS was observed before and after KDPC implementation. Among high severity cases, 
LOS significantly increased. Across all admissions, the trend change increased with case severity 
(CCI 0, 1: 0.022, p = 0.0142; CCI 2, 3: 0.026, p = 0.0288; CCI ≥ 4: 0.055, p = 0.0003). For 
appendectomy admissions, only the CCI ≥ 4 subgroup exhibited a statistically significant trend 
change in LOS between cases and controls (0.077, p = 0.0044). For hernia procedures, all CCI 
subgroups exhibited a statistically significant trend change (CCI 0, 1: 0.033, p = 0.0361; CCI 2, 3: 
0.049, p = 0.0045; CCI ≥ 4: 0.043, p =0.0379 ). 
Conclusion: Average LOS for surgical DRG admissions increased following the change in 
payment system from DRG to KDCP. This LOS increase was observed specifically for complex 
procedure admissions and high severity cases. Although both payment systems are optimized to 
iii 
 
decrease LOS, incentives to reduce LOS are stronger under the DRG system than under the KDPC 
system. Therefore, these findings suggest that incentives under the DRG lead to excessive LOS 
decrease in Korea. We suggest that policymakers and stakeholders should focus on the development 
of an appropriate reimbursement system that focuses on more than cost containment, saving resources, 
or LOS reduction. More evidence and studies that focus on associations between payment systems 
and medical outcomes, resource spending, and quality will be needed to achieve this goal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Korean Diagnosis Procedure Combination, KDPC, Diagnosis Related Group, DRG, 
Length of stay, LOS, Payment system, Reimbursement, Bundled payment, Surgical DRG
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I. Introduction 
 
 
 
It is well known that the system by which purchasers choose to pay providers has a significant 
impact on the medical decisions and clinical and professional behavior of providers1-4. Due to this 
impact, insurance payment systems have been used to achieve political objectives, such as cost 
containment and recruitment to underserved areas5,6. Since the introduction of the National Health 
Insurance (NHI) in 1977, Fee-For-Service (FFS) has been the primary payment system for medical 
services and supplies in Korea7. Although the Korean government has regulated some medical costs, 
including reimbursements to medical suppliers8, health-related spending has increased consistently 
and sharply. Both experts and the government have argued that the FFS system, which offers 
providers autonomy in medical decision-making, is the root of uncontrolled health care costs3,7-9.  
The adoption of a diagnosis-related group (DRG)-based payment system, which is a form of a case-
based prospective payment system (PPS) under which payment is based on particular diagnoses for 
hospital inpatient services10, was officially proposed by the task force for health care reform in 1994, 
partly as a political move. Since the implementation of the Medicare inpatient care payment system in 
the United States in 1983, DRG-based payment systems have emerged as a popular hospital payment 
system in many European countries and other countries worldwide11,12. Compared with the FFS-based 
payment system, the DRG-based payment system is a supply-side cost-sharing payment system that 
incentivizes providers to contain medical expenses by introducing economic consequences of health 
care utilization to the provider13. The Korean government accepted and started a pilot project to 
implement a DRG-based system as a means to contain health care costs in October 19977. The DRG-
based payment system was officially introduced in 2002 for seven DRG principal diagnoses, 
including three principal surgical diagnoses (appendicitis, hernia, and hemorrhoid) on a voluntary 
basis. The DRG-based payment system has been mandatory for seven principal diagnoses since July 
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2012, and was expanded to include all medical institutes except long-term care hospitals and public 
hospitals in July 2013.  
Meanwhile, another bundled payment system, the Diagnosis Procedure Combination (DPC), was 
introduced in 2009. The name of this bundled payment system in Korean means “new DRG”. 
However, in this study, we have named this bundled payment system the Korean Diagnosis Procedure 
Combination (KDPC), because this system is very similar to the Japanese DPC. The DPC-based 
system is a mixed system that includes a flat-rate (i.e., per-case or per-diem) payment and FFS 
payment, which distinguishes the KDPC from the DRG-based system14. The Health Insurance Review 
and Assessment Service (HIRA), which is a government agency that reviews claims submitted by 
providers, assesses the quality of care provided, and makes decisions for reimbursement, introduced 
the KDPC as a payment system for 550 principal diagnoses admissions at all public hospitals in July 
2012.   
Therefore, three payment systems currently coexist in Korea. The government has set a goal to 
introduce a bundled payment system as the national basic payment system to contain costs by 
transitioning risk to the suppliers. This system is also expected to improve administrative 
conveniences. Suppliers are resistant to a bundled payment system. Furthermore, there is no public 
consent about the best system. The National Health Insurance council (NHIC), which is the top 
decision-making body of the NHI contract, suggested a roadmap that would expand a bundled 
payment system to combine DRG and KDPC. However, although several studies have reported the 
effect of the payment system change from FFS to DRG8,10,15-20 and from FFS to KDPC21,22, no studies 
have directly compared the DRG-based system with the KDPC-based system. Hence, there exists a 
need for a more comprehensive comparison and evaluation of these systems to determine which 
system would be more appropriate in Korea and to inform the overall decision of the NHIC. Therefore, 
this study analyzed the impact of change from DRG to KDPC with a focus on the average length of 
stay (LOS). A difference observed between DRG and KDPC may provide important evidence for 
selecting or developing the next-generation payment system in Korea.  
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II. Objectives 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of the change in payment system from DRG to 
KDPC in Korea on the average LOS for surgical diagnoses. 
 
The detailed objectives of this study were as follows: 
  
(1) To analyze the effect of the change in payment system from DRG to KDPC on average LOS 
among surgical inpatients by diagnosis, severity, and hospital type at the time of the implemented 
change. 
(2) To analyze the effect of the change in payment system from DRG to KDPC on the change in 
average LOS by diagnosis, severity, and hospital type.  
 
This study aims to compare two bundled payment systems to provide evidence for the development of 
an appropriate reimbursement system in Korea. 
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III. Study Background 
 
 
1. Health care payment system 
 
A “payment system” is the methodology that a payer uses to compensate one or more providers for 
care provided to a patient. This system includes definitions of what will and will not be compensated, 
the ways in which compensation will vary depending on the characteristics of the patient or care 
provided, and which providers and/or costs will be covered under a single payment23. There are seven 
traditional methods of provider reimbursement that have been utilized within the healthcare 
system23,24. 
 
Table 1. Methods of provider reimbursement 
Payment method Explanation 
Fee-for-service A provider is paid a fee for rendering a specific service. 
Per diem A provider is paid a set amount per patient for each day that patient is in the provider’s care. 
All services rendered during that day are covered under the set amount.  
Case payment (DRG) A single provider is paid a set amount for all services rendered (by that provider) during a 
admission of care. 
Episode-of-care A single provider is paid a set amount for all services rendered (by that provider) during a 
defined “episode” of care. For example, a provider may be paid a pre-determined amount for 
a patient undergoing a kidney transplant. This payment would cover the surgery and all 
services, including follow-up, associated with that “episode.” Using this method there would 
typically be multiple payments for a single episode since more than one provider may treat a 
patient. 
Multi-provider bundled episode-of-
care 
Multiple providers are jointly paid for all services rendered during an episode of care, as 
defined above. Using this method there would only be a single payment made by the payer, 
which would cover the services rendered by all providers. 
Condition-specific capitation One or more providers are paid a pre-determined fee to cover all services rendered for a 
specific condition. These payments can be either a onetime fee or on going depending on the 
severity of the illness.  
Capitation One or more providers are paid a regular, pre-determined fee to cover all services rendered 
for the continuous care of a patient. This fee covers all episodes and all conditions. 
 
There is no perfect payment method. Each type of provider reimbursement method carries its own 
set of risks. Those risks are assumed either by the payer, the provider, or both. Generally speaking, as 
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you move down the payment type list from FFS to capitation, the risk shifts from payer to provider24  
 
 
Figure 1. Continuum of health care payment methods (modified Miller, 2007; Nicole, 2008) 
 
According to Miller, different methods of payment assign different levels of risk to either the payer 
or provider (Figure 2). FFS systems tend to provide financial incentives for providers to overtreat the 
patient. Under an FFS system, the payer assumes the full risk of care; the payer can pay or choose not 
to pay for as many services as the provider is willing to render. Under an episode-of-care system, the 
provider assumes slightly more risk because it is unknown at the beginning of the “episode” what 
services may be needed. Condition-specific capitation incentivizes the provider to limit the number of 
“episodes” of care per condition. Full capitation incentivizes the provider to prevent illness in the 
patient and to treat any illness in an efficient manner. However, full capitation is also more risky to 
providers that treat sicker-than-average populations. Essentially, payment methods that include any 
kind of bundling or capitation create a financial risk for providers, which may cause them to 
undertreat their patients. In contrast, payment methods that individualize services and their associated 
payments (e.g., FFS) put patients at risk of overtreatment. 
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Figure 2. Variables for Which the Provider is at Risk Under Alternative Payment System 
(modified Miller, 2007) 
2. Previous studies of the impact of payment system changes on LOS 
 
Many countries have recently introduced new payment systems or implemented a change in payment 
systems, primarily for financial reasons. Many countries have changed from a traditional payment 
system to a DRG/PPS payment system. Previous studies on the effect of payment method changes on 
LOS are shown in Table 2. LOS is a representative index for the evaluation of the impact of a 
payment change in these studies, because LOS is easy to estimate and directly correlates with 
resource spending.   
Many studies have explored the introduction of DRG to the United States in 198325-29. According to 
Ellis et al., average LOS decreased by 4.5 days due to a payment system change from Retrospective and 
procedural reimbursement to DRG, 1.8 days of which were attributed to a moral hazard effect, and -3.0 
days of which were attributed to what we have called a practice-style effect26. In another study on the 
impact of change from a cost-based reimbursement method to a per-diem method and per-case 
prospective payment method, approximately 85% of per-diem patients were discharged by the 25th 
day since admission compared with 79% of cost-based payment patients (and 86% of per-case 
payment patients)27. Freimen et al. further showed that a decrease in LOS due to the payment system 
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change from Retrospective and procedural reimbursement to DRG was observed in for-profit hospitals but not 
in non-profit hospitals28. Marjorie et al. also reported a decrease in LOS in community hospitals29. 
 The impact of a payment system change from FFS to DRG has also been studied in other countries. 
In Taiwan, a 10% decrease in LOS of coronary artery patients was observed30. Similarly, in 
Switzerland, LOS was decreased by 1.9 days31. In China, in one study, the growth rate in LOS was 
reported to be 13.1% and 13.0% points lower in diseases covered by the DRG than diseases not paid 
by the DRG in 2004 and 2005, respectively32, but another study reported contradictory results33. 
In Israel and Austria, the payment system method changed from a per-diem method to a DRG-based 
payment method. According to Shmueli et al., LOS among patients who underwent surgical 
procedures decreased by 5.6-21.7% in Israel34. In Austria, average LOS decreased by 0.493 days35. 
Several reports have examined the impact of the change in payment method to a smaller payment 
unit. Hersen et al. showed that average LOS decreased in response to a change from a budgeting 
system to a DRG system in Germany36. Similarly, in Italy, average LOS decreased from 9.1 days to 
8.8 days, resulting in a 21.1 percent decrease in hospital bed days (p < 0.001), following a change 
from a global budgeting payment system to a DRG-based system37. Average LOS also decreased from 
11.78 to 8.99 days (-2.78 days) in Hungary after the payment method changed from a hospital budget 
to a DRG-based system38. 
The DPC-based system was introduced in Japan in 2003. Before the introduction of DPC, FFS was 
the traditional payment method. In addition, a pilot implementation of DRG/PPS was applied in 1998. 
According to both Okamura et al. and Wang et al., average LOS has decreased by 4.5% in Japan 
under the DPC-based payment system39,40. However, because DRG/PPS was not implemented over a 
long time period, it is hard to find studies which have compared the impact of DRG and DPC on LOS. 
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Table 2. Previous studies about the effect of payment method change on LOS 
Study Payment method change Result about LOS Year from to 
DesHarnais SI 
et al. 
Retrospective 
and procedural 
reimbursement 
DRG/PPS Average length of stay decreased, especially for patients treated in scatter beds. 1990 
Ellis RP et al. 
Retrospective 
and procedural 
reimbursement 
DRG/PPS 
4.5 day reduction in LOS (14%) . 1.8 days of this change can 
be attributed to a pure moral hazard effect, and -3.0 days to 
what we have called the practice-style effect. The overall 
population may be getting slightly sicker, increasing average 
LOS by + 0.3 days.  
1996 
Frank RG et 
al. 
Cost-based 
reimbursement 
Per diem 
rates 
85% of the per diem payment patients have been discharged by 
the 25th day compare with79% for cost-based payment patient. 
1989 Per case 
prospective 
payment 
86% of the per case payment patients have been discharged by 
the 25th day compare with79% for cost-based payment patient. 
Freimen MP 
et al. 
Retrospective 
and procedural 
reimbursement 
DRG/PPS 
Not-for-profit hospitals experienced declines in lengths of stay 
averaging between 10% and 20% two years after they went 
onto PPS, while for-profit hospitals experienced a somewhat 
greater decline. 
1989 
Marjorie A. 
Rosenberg et 
al. 
FFS DRG/PPS 
Average length of stay fell 9%. In 1995, average length of stay 
was 7.1 days. Average length of stay at national community 
hospitals declined from 7.7 days per stay in 1975 to 6.5 in 
1995. 
2001 
Cheng et al. FFS DRG/PPS 10% decrease (p<0.001) in patient's length of stay of coronary artery patient in Taiwan.  2012 
P. Schuetz et 
al. FFS DRG/PPS 
LOS in DRG hospitals was significantly shorter compared to 
FFS hospitals (8.4 vs 10.3 days, absolute difference 1.9 days in  
Switzerland. 
2011 
Yip W et al. FFS DRG/PPS Did not decrease LOS (+0.70day) in China. 2001 
Jiale Zhang FFS DRG/PPS 
The growth rates of LOS were 13.1 and 13.0 percentage points 
lower than that of other diseases during the 2004 and 2005 
experiments, respectively. 
2010 
Shmueli A et 
al. Per-diem DRG/PPS Surgery procedure LOS decreased -5.6~-21.7% in Israel. 2002 
E. Theurl et 
al. Per diem 
Per case-
based Impact on average LOS is -0.493 days in Austria. 2007 
P. Hensen et 
al 
budgeting 
system DRG/PPS The average LOS has been continually reduced in Germany. 2007 
D.Z. Louis et 
al. 
Global 
budgeting DRG/PPS 
The mean length of stay decreased from 9.1 days to 8.8 days, 
resulting in a 21.1 percent decrease in hospital bed days (p 
< .001), in Italy. 
1999 
M. Kroneman 
et al. Hospital budget DRG/PPS 
The average LOS decreased from 11.78 to 8.99 (-2.78) in 
Hungary. 2001 
Wang K et al. FFS DPC The ALOS is significantly reduced.  2010 
Okamura et 
al. FFS DPC 
ALOS has shown a 4.5% decline at the special functioning 
hospitals under the DPC payment system, whereas a 1.5% 
decline has been seen at all medical hospitals under the 
conventional fee-for-service payment system in April–October 
2002 when compared with the same term in 2003. 
2005 
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3. The Bundled Payment System in Korea 
 
The bundled payment system is a general term of paying system which is bundling a payment unit in 
particular level. And it could be classified according to payment unit, as follow41(table 3). 
 
Table 3 Classification of bundled payment 
 Per outpatient visit Per admission day Per admission Per episode 
Physician OPPS    Hospital  per diem DRG  
Physician and Hospital  
DPC 
KDPC  per episode 
*OPPS: Outpatient prospective payment system; DPC: Diagnosis procedure combination; KDPC: Korea diagnosis 
procedure combination; DRG: Diagnosis related group  
*Source of Park et al.26) 
 
An outpatient prospective payment system (OPPS) was implemented to reimburse outpatient visits 
for Medicare beneficiaries in the United States in 200029. OPPS is a bundled payment system in which 
payments are paid per outpatient visit22,42,43. The Korean version of the OPPS, the Ambulatory Patient 
Group (APG), was developed in 2006 but has not been implemented43. According to Averill et al., an 
episode payment would encompass services delivered not only during the hospitalization itself but 
also during pre- and post-hospitalization delivery of care (e.g., outpatient, ancillary, physician visit). 
An episode payment system is therefore more patient-centered than a case-based payment system 
such as DRG. An episode payment system has not yet been implemented in Korea44. 
The Medicare inpatient care system in the United States is an example of a DRG-based payment 
system13. The Korean DRG (K-DRG) has been modified several times. The first pilot K-DRG project 
was implemented in 199745. The official DRG payment system was selectively implemented in Korea 
in 2002. Seven principal diagnoses across four departments (Surgery; Ear, Nose, and Throat [ENT], 
Ophthalmology; and Obstetrics and Gynecology) were included in this initial DRG-based payment 
system. Compulsory participation of hospitals and clinics was effective as of July 2012. Compulsory 
participation was expanded to general and tertiary hospitals in July 2013. Thus, payments for all seven 
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diagnoses covered under the DRG-based system have been paid by this system since July 2013, 
except those from long-term hospitals and public hospitals.  
Many studies have examined the DRG-based payment system in Korea. According to a study by 
Kang et al. in 2009 and another by Choi et al. in 2012, LOS among patients covered by the DRG has 
decreased46,47. Other studies have reported that a decrease in LOS depends on the diagnosis. For 
example, Shin et al. reported that LOS decreased by 24.1% from 2.57 days to 1.95 days among 
patients who underwent lens surgery, but was not significantly decreased for any other diagnoses48. In 
2006, Lee et al. reported that LOS decreased for several DRGs, except pediatric bilateral hernia 
procedures, laparoscopic hysterectomy, laparoscopic uterine and adnexa surgery, and Cesarean 
delivery49. According to the official presentation of HIRA in 2013, LOS among patients covered by 
the DRG-based payment system was decreased compared to patients with these diagnoses prior to the 
DRG-based payment system expansion. In particular, LOS for patients who received hemorrhoid 
procedures was dramatically decreased by 24.4%50.  
Other indices of patient care were also improved by the change to a DRG-based payment system. 
Kang et al. reported that the number of medical supplies provided by suppliers decreased by an 
average of 8.2% following DRG implementation, without a negative effect on patient care51. A 
decrease in medical supplies was observed among patients receiving lens surgery in particular. In 
addition, inpatient care fees (-40.8%), medication fees (-33.6%), injection fees (-30.0%), anesthesia 
fees (-17.4%), surgical material fees (-15.0%), and prescription days (-36.5%, from 3.23 days to 2.05 
days) were decreased for unilateral lens surgery. Inpatient care fees (-27.0%), medication fees (-
33.9%), injection fees (-21.6%), surgical material fees (-22.5%), and prescription fees (-19.4%, from 
5.46 days to 4.40 days) were also decreased for bilateral lens surgery52. However, according to Choi et 
al., the readmission rate had increased47.  
Market competition has an effect on the impact of DRG implementation15. No side effects were 
observed for laparoscopic appendectomy16. According to Kim et al., there were no significant 
differences in perioperative outcomes and medical costs, except a shorter LOS, among patients who 
11 
 
received an appendectomy. Shon et al. suggested that a non-significant reduction in LOS may have 
been related to the voluntary nature of participation in the DRG-based system17,18. Results from Song 
et al. suggest that Obstetrics and Gynecology clinics with an economic practice pattern under a fee-
for-service system were more likely to participate in the DRG-based payment system than clinics that 
utilized a different system19.   
Japan experienced a dramatic increase in health expenditures over several decades under the FFS 
payment system. A pilot program of a DRG/PPS-like system was implemented in 1998 to control 
health expenditures14. Unlike in the United States, in Japan the reimbursement for hospitals and 
doctors is combined, and thus a DRG-based payment system is not suitable for Japan. In 2003, PPS 
with a DRG-rearranged grouping system called the diagnostic procedure combination/per-diem 
payment system (DPC/PDPS) was formally introduced in Japan. The major difference between the 
DPC and DRG is that the DPC/PDPS classifies inpatient activities first by diagnosis and then by 
procedure, whereas the DRG/PPS classification is a procedure-dominant system. In addition, DPC 
reimburses per diem and includes an FFS component for reimbursement of expensive procedures. 
 
Figure 3. Method for setting per-diem payment rates in DPC payment rate (Ishii, 2012) 
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Figure 4. Comparison of prospective payment per hospital stay and per-diem prospective 
method (modified Ishii, 2012) 
As shown in Figure 3, the per-diem fee schedule was associated with a short LOS53. This structure 
therefore provides incentives to decrease LOS. The per-diem rate varies by inpatient period. When the 
average LOS is dichotomized, LOS shorter than the average was associated with a 15% higher fee 
score, and LOS longer than the average was associated with a 15% lower fee score. Therefore, when a 
patient stays for an average LOS, the cumulative fee is the same as the average fee. When the LOS 
exceeds the average, the per-diem fee is discounted such that the average per-diem fee is decreased7 
(Figure 4). 
The KDPC payment system, which was based on the Japanese DPC payment system, has been 
introduced by HIRA to expand the bundled payment system in Korea. The KDPC fee schedule, which 
is calculated as [basic case payment + (hospital days - average hospital days) × per-diem rate], reflects 
the difference between the average LOS and case LOS. This fee schedule includes a 20% fee for non-
KDPC items; therefore, when the provider claims a fee for an FFS-scheduled item, this item is paid at 
80%. Non-KDPC items include expensive procedures, materials, and pharmaceuticals that exceed 
100,000 Korean Won (approximately 80 U.S. dollars), and are reimbursed by the FFS-based payment 
system (at 80%)7. According to Kang et al., the aim of this FFS schedule-based fee discount is to 
control the supplier’s behavior during the transition to a non-KDPC fee schedule.  
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The KDPC pilot project was implemented in one hospital in 2009 and was expanded to three large 
public hospitals in July 2011. Since July 2012, all public hospitals (39 medical institutions) have 
participated in the KDPC payment system for 550 principal DRGs. However, studies on the impact of 
the KDPC system are rare. According to a report by Kang et al., LOS associated with principal DRGs 
decreased by 0.13 days (p = 0.48) during the first pilot project and by 0.47 days (p < 0.001) for 
additional principal DRGs during the second pilot project. During the third pilot project, LOS for 
medical DRGs increased by 0.18 days (p = 0.27), LOS for surgical DRGs increased by 0.67 days (p = 
0.001), and LOS for psychiatry DRGs decreased by 7.48 days (p = 0.0001)54. Similarly, Park et al. 
reported that LOS decreased by 1.9 days in the third pilot project, which was implemented in a public 
hospital. A difference analysis revealed a statistically significant decrease in LOS by 0.8 days in the 
third pilot project and by 0.9 days in the fourth pilot project55,56. In contrast, Kim et al. reported an 
increase in LOS in five principal DRGs and a decrease in LOS in one principal DRG among high 
frequency principal DRGs21. 
 
 
  
14 
 
IV. Study Methods 
 
1. Study design 
 
In this study, hospitals that consistently participated in the DRG payment system from January 2007 
to June 2012 and underwent a change in payment system to the KDPC payment system from July 
2012 to June 2014 were defined as case hospitals. All case hospitals are public hospitals because the 
KDPC has been implemented in public hospitals only. Hospitals that consistently participated in the 
DRG payment system from January 2007 to June 2014 were defined as control hospitals. All control 
hospitals are private hospitals because these hospitals were not required to change to the KDPC 
system. Among the 39 public hospitals that implemented the KDPC payment system, two hospitals 
previously used an FFS payment system and were excluded from this study. Two additional hospitals 
were excluded from the study due to missing data. Therefore, 35 hospitals were included as case 
hospitals in our study. Among 1,996 medical institutes that were paid more than once by the DRG 
payment system for principal surgical DRGs, 326 institutes consistently participated in the DRG 
payment system. Clinics were excluded because no clinics were included as case hospitals. Therefore, 
60 hospitals were included as control hospitals in this study. 
The number of admissions to case hospitals was 39,364 and the number of admissions to control 
hospitals was 477,668. We conducted 1:2 sampling using the propensity score matching method for 
age, sex, Charlson comorbidity index (CCI), sub-DRG, and admission date (month). The area under 
the curve (AUC) value was 0.836. A total of 36,240 case admissions and 72,480 control admissions 
were included in the final analysis. Figure 5 shows the case and control groups during the study 
period and Figure 6 shows the selection of the study population.  
The Institutional Review Board of Yonsei University Graduate School of Public Health 
approved the study (approval no. 2015-406).
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Figure 5. Study period for interrupted time series with case and control 
 
 
Figure 6. Selection of study population 
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2. Data and variables 
 
This study used claim data provided by HIRA. Seven principal DRGs are included in the DRG 
payment system in Korea. Surgical principal DRGs include appendectomy (G08), hernia procedures 
(G09), and anal procedures (G10). Each principal DRG includes four sub-DRGs. Table 4 reports the 
sub-DRGs by principal DRGs. 
 
Table 4. Sub-DRGs by principal DRGs in Surgery 
DRG Sub-DRG (Adjacent DRG, ADRG) 
G08 Appendectomy  G081 Appendectomy with complicated principal diagnosis 
G082 Appendectomy without complicated principal diagnosis 
G083 Laparoscopic appendectomy with complicated principal 
diagnosis 
G084 Laparoscopic appendectomy without complicated 
principal diagnosis 
G09 Hernia procedures G095 Inguinal & femoral hernia procedures without resection 
of intestine, unilateral, Laparoscopy 
G096 Inguinal & femoral hernia procedures without resection 
of intestine, unilateral 
G097 Inguinal & femoral hernia procedures without resection 
of intestine, bilateral, Laparoscopy 
G098 Inguinal & femoral hernia procedures without resection 
of intestine, bilateral 
G10 Anal procedures G102 Multiple anal procedures 
G104 Other anal procedures 
G105 Circular stapled hemorrhoidectomy 
G106 Major anal procedures 
 
The dependent variable in our study is LOS of the admission case. LOS is a representative index that 
reflects the effectiveness of admission and is commonly used to evaluate the impact of a payment 
system change. Prior studies that have evaluated payment system change from a FFS-based payment 
system to a case-based payment system report a decrease in LOS under case-based systems. This 
result is expected due to the difference in cost-sharing between FFS and bundled payment systems. A 
case-based payment system, such as the DRG or KPDC, provides incentives to reduce LOS for-profit 
maximization. Therefore, LOS is considered a proper index to estimate differences between DRG and 
KDPC in this study. Theoretically, KDPC does not provide as much incentive to decrease LOS as 
DRG. Therefore, a change in LOS due a change from DRG to KDPC may reflect other effects in 
17 
addition to economic incentives. 
Age, sex, region (hospital location), sub-DRG, CCI, season, and year were included as individual-
level covariates. Hospital type, ownership, teaching status, region, number of beds, number of doctors, 
and number of nurses were included as hospital-level covariates. Age, number of beds, number of 
doctors, and number of nurses were included as continuous variables. Sub-DRG included 12 
subgroups (Table 4). CCI was calculated yearly based on Quan’s methods57; 19 diseases were 
classified into scores of 1, 2, 3, or 6 (Table 5). CCI per subject was calculated from the sum of all 
scores. In this study, CCI was grouped as scores of 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 or more. Four seasons were 
included to adjust for seasonal variations due to known seasonality in temperature and medical service 
utilization in Korea. Hospital type was classified as either general hospital or hospital. The bundled 
payment fee schedule varies between these two hospital types in Korea. Ownership was classified as 
public, corporate, or private. The KDPC was compulsory only in public hospitals; therefore, there are 
no private hospitals among the case hospitals and no public hospitals among the control hospitals. 
Teaching status (teaching or non-teaching) and region (urban or rural) were included as binary 
variables.  
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Table 5. Charlson comorbidity index scoring system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Score Condition 
1 Myocardial infarction 
Congestive heart failure 
Peripheral vascular disease 
Cerebrovascular disease 
Dementia 
Chronic pulmonary disease 
Connective tissue disease 
Ulcer disease 
Mild liver disease 
Diabetes 
2 Hemiplegia 
Moderate-to-severe renal failure 
Diabetes w/ end organ damage 
Any malignancy 
Leukemia / lymphoma 
3 Moderate or severe liver disease 
6 Metastatic solid tumor 
AIDS/HIV 
Source: Charlson et al.57  
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3. Statistical method 
 
Segmented regression analysis of interrupted time series with control was carried out for analysis in 
this study, using the following equation (Equation 1): 
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽4𝐾𝑖𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 × Case + 𝛽6𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡 × Case+  𝛽7𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡 × 𝐾𝑖𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑡𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇1𝑍1 + ⋯  + 𝜇𝑝𝑍𝑝 +  𝑡𝑡 ⋯ (1) 
 
Yt: Average length of stay of month t  
t: time period (month) 
time: a continuous variable started in January 2007 by month 
Case: a binary variable (0 Control hospitals; 1 Case hospitals) 
KDPC implementationt: a binary variable (0 before June 2012; 1 after July 2012) 
time after KDPC implementationt: a continuous variable started in July 2012 
Seasont: seasonality (1 spring, 2 summer, 3 autumn, 4 winter) 
𝜇𝑝𝑍𝑝: independent variables (1⋯p) 
e  t = Random variation in length of stay across time within hospital (within hospital variation)  
 
In Equation 1, β6 represents the level of change in the difference between case and control LOS at 
the time of KDPC implementation. β7 represents the trend in the difference between case and control 
LOS after KDPC implementation. Equation 1 was implemented in PROC GENMOD (SAS version 
9.4) as a generalized estimation equation (GEE) and mixed model with link identity, distribution 
normal, and AR(1).  
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V. Results 
 
Before propensity score matching, all variables were significantly different between cases and 
controls. Table 6 presents the general characteristics of the study population following the application 
of propensity score matching methods for age, sex, sub-DRG, and CCI. In addition, the time of the 
outcome was also included as a matching variable in order to implement time-series analysis for 
propensity score matching with 1:2 ratio samples. The AUC value of regression with these variables 
was 0.863. Tables S1 and S2 in the Appendix report general admission characteristics before and after 
propensity score matching by period.  
Average LOS was significantly higher in cases compared with controls. There were no significant 
differences in average age between cases and controls (40.8 vs. 40.7 years, respectively). Over 60% of 
patients were male in both groups. Although we performed propensity score matching, the proportion 
of CCI classes remained significantly different between cases and controls; however, the proportion of 
each CCI level is more similar between groups than before matching was applied.  
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Table 6. General characteristics of admissions after Propensity Score Matching (n, %) 
Variables Case (n=36,240) 
  
  
Control 
(n=72,480) 
  
p-value  
  
Length of Stay (mean, SD) 5.28 ±2.36  4.80 ±2.50  <0.001 
Age (mean, SD) 40.8 ±21.3  40.7 ±21.1  0.155 
<10      1,949  5.4       4,259  5.9   <0.001  
10~19      5,928  16.4     11,613  16.0   
20~29      4,504  12.4       8,918  12.3   
30~39      5,079  14.0       9,949  13.7   
40~49      5,465  15.1     10,985  15.2   
50~59      5,143  14.2     10,577  14.6   
60~67      4,268  11.8       8,845  12.2   
>=70      3,904  10.8       7,334  10.1   
Sex        
Male    22,798  62.9     46,758  64.5   <0.001  
Female    13,442  37.1     25,722  35.5   
Principal diagnosis        
Appendectomy    44,867  61.9     22,360  61.7       0.744  
Hernia procedures    11,856  16.4       5,989  16.5   
Hemorrhoid procedures    15,757  21.7       7,891  21.8   
Charson comorbidity index        
0    17,416  48.1     34,693  47.9       0.007  
1      5,987  16.5     11,994  16.6   
2      5,013  13.8     10,384  14.3   
3      4,228  11.7       8,639  11.9   
≥4      3,596  9.9       6,670  9.3   
Season            0.184  
Spring      9,760  26.9     19,853  27.4   
Summer      9,617  26.5     18,851  26.0   
Autumn      7,707  21.3     15,533  21.4   
Winter      9,156  25.3     18,243  25.2   
Period        <0.001  
2007.1~2008.6      7,435  20.5     15,506  21.4   
2008.7~2009.6      4,855  13.4     10,194  14.1   
2009.7~2010.6      5,007  13.8       9,867  13.6   
2010.7~2011.6      4,513  12.5       9,330  12.9   
2011.7~2012.6      4,935  13.6       9,494  13.1   
2012.7~2013.6      4,589  12.66       8,865  12.23   
2013.7~2014.6      4,906  13.54        9,224  12.73     
Total    36,240  33.3      72,480  66.7     
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Table 7 presents the general characteristics of the study population at the hospital level. Case 
hospitals (n = 35) included 31 (88.6%) general hospitals and 4 (11.4%) hospitals. In contrast, control 
hospitals (n = 60) included 28 (46.7%) general hospitals and 32 (53.3%) hospitals. There was no 
significant difference in teaching status between case and control hospitals (p = 0.814). There were 
also no significant differences between cases and controls in the numbers of beds, doctors, or nurses 
(p = 0.4754, 0.5046, and 0.7156 respectively). A significant difference in hospital region was 
observed (71.4% vs. 36.7% rural for cases vs. controls, respectively; p = 0.0011). 
 
 
Table 7. General characteristics of hospitals (n, %) 
Variables Case (n=35)   
Control 
(n=60) p-value 
Hospital type       General hospital 31 88.6  28 46.7 <0.0001 Hospital 4 11.4  32 53.3  Hospital ownership       Public 31 88.6  0 0 <0.0001 Corporation 4 11.4  28 46.7  Private 0 0  32 53.3  Teaching status       Teaching 8 22.9  15 25.0 0.814 Non-teaching 27 77.1  45 75.0  Region       Urban 10 28.6  38 63.3 0.001 Rural 25 71.4  22 36.7  Number of bed (means) 306.5 154.5  275.4 268.8 0.475 <300 bed 25 71.4  47 78.3 0.6780 300~499 bed 6 17.1  9 15.0  500~700 bed 4 11.4  4 6.7  Number of doctor (means) 31.2 31.0  38.1 67.7 0.5050 Number of nurse (means) 96.7 59.0   90.4 108.1 0.7160 
Total 35 36.8   60 63.2   
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Table 8 reports LOS for case and control hospitals stratified by several variables. Before 
implementation of the KDPC system, average LOS was 5.35 days (SD = 2.40) among cases and 4.85 
days (SD = 2.46) among controls. After implementation of the KDPC system, average LOS was 5.06 
days (SD = 2.23) among cases and 4.62 days (SD = 2.58) among controls. LOS increased with 
increasing age, and LOS was longer among female patients compared with male patients. 
Appendectomy had the longest LOS and hernia procedures had the second longest LOS. LOS was 
longer for higher CCI. Average LOS decreased over time from January 2007 to June 2014. LOS was 
longer at general hospitals compared with hospitals among cases. In contrast, among controls, LOS 
was longer at hospitals compared with general hospitals. LOS was longer in teaching hospitals 
compared with non-teaching hospitals. Average LOS was longer at rural hospitals compared with 
urban hospitals among controls; there was no significant difference in LOS between urban and rural 
hospitals among cases.  
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Table 8. Length of stay of hospitals by case and control  (mean, SD) 
Variables 
Case (n=39,364) 
p-value 
  Control (n=72,480) 
p-value Before Intervention, 
2007.1~2012.6 
  After 
Intervention, 
2012.7~2014.6 
 Before Intervention, 
2007.1~2012.6 
  After 
Intervention, 
2012.7~2014.6       
Age               <10 4.71 ±2.21  4.41 ±2.04 0.013  4.62 ±2.58  4.66 ±3.23 0.711 10~19 5.21 ±1.87  5.12 ±1.80 0.117  5.08 ±1.96  4.91 ±1.91 <0.0001 20~29 5.23 ±2.07  5.13 ±1.89 0.177  4.79 ±2.11  4.41 ±2.00 <0.0001 30~39 5.28 ±2.21  5.05 ±2.03 0.001  4.69 ±2.26  4.43 ±2.40 <0.0001 40~49 5.41 ±2.47  5.09 ±2.20 <0.0001  4.75 ±2.51  4.54 ±2.46 <0.0001 50~59 5.57 ±2.75  5.09 ±2.38 <0.0001  4.83 ±2.62  4.53 ±2.60 <0.0001 60~67 5.47 ±2.58  5.01 ±2.43 <0.0001  4.84 ±2.83  4.70 ±3.00 0.044 >=70 5.69 ±2.98  5.15 ±2.80 <0.0001  5.16 ±3.02  4.77 ±3.13 <0.0001 Sex              Male 5.23 ±2.38  4.90 ±2.26 <0.0001  4.67 ±2.45  4.41 ±2.56 <0.0001 Female 5.55 ±2.44  5.35 ±2.16 <0.0001  5.18 ±2.46  5.02 ±2.58 <0.0001 Principal diagnosis              Appendectomy 5.75 ±2.27  5.61 ±2.12 <0.0001  5.66 ±2.36  5.58 ±2.53 0.002 Hernia procedures 4.93 ±2.23  4.38 ±2.22 <0.0001  3.91 ±2.22  3.50 ±2.28 <0.0001 Hemorrhoid 
procedures 4.53 ±2.61  4.07 ±2.07 <0.0001  3.16 ±1.70  3.02 ±1.61 <0.0001 
Charson comorbidity 
index              
0 5.17 ±2.07  5.03 ±1.93 <0.0001  4.84 ±2.18  4.61 ±2.26 <0.0001 1 5.40 ±2.44  5.06 ±2.19 <0.0001  4.74 ±2.49  4.49 ±2.41 <0.0001 2 5.56 ±2.72  5.09 ±2.37 <0.0001  4.82 ±2.64  4.57 ±2.68 <0.0001 3 5.49 ±2.57  4.98 ±2.37 <0.0001  4.86 ±2.80  4.68 ±2.96 0.011 ≥4 5.74 ±3.11  5.23 ±2.90 <0.0001  5.22 ±3.11  4.83 ±3.19 <0.0001 Season              Spring 5.34 ±2.41  5.10 ±2.24 <0.0001  4.85 ±2.44  4.57 ±2.52 <0.0001 Summer 5.35 ±2.37  5.01 ±2.27 <0.0001  4.90 ±2.45  4.68 ±2.64 <0.0001 Autumn 5.37 ±2.37  5.14 ±2.29 <0.0001  4.90 ±2.49  4.67 ±2.58 <0.0001 Winter 5.35 ±2.46  5.02 ±2.13 <0.0001  4.77 ±2.48  4.57 ±2.58 <0.0001 Period              2007.1~2008.6 5.64 ±2.36    <0.0001  5.00 ±2.51    <0.0001 2008.7~2009.6 5.45 ±2.31      4.88 ±2.37     2009.7~2010.6 5.28 ±2.43      4.83 ±2.45     2010.7~2011.6 5.14 ±2.43      4.79 ±2.51     2011.7~2012.6 5.09 ±2.46      4.68 ±2.45     2012.7~2013.6    4.98 ±2.16      4.64 ±2.57  2013.7~2014.6    5.14 ±2.30      4.60 ±2.59  Hospital type              General hospital 5.33 ±2.38  5.04 ±2.23 <0.0001  5.47 ±2.37  5.42 ±2.51 0.092 Hospital 5.79 ±2.80  5.47 ±2.34 0.031  4.26 ±2.41  3.87 ±2.41 <0.0001 Hospital ownership              Public 5.40 ±2.38  5.12 ±2.21 <0.0001  - -  - -  Corporation 5.03 ±2.50  4.70 ±2.38 <0.0001  5.51 ±2.48  5.44 ±2.58 0.033 Private - -  - -   4.37 ±2.34  3.99 ±2.40 <0.0001 Teaching status              Teaching 5.72 ±2.39  5.33 ±2.28 <0.0001  5.35 ±2.29  5.45 ±2.44 0.007 Non-teaching 5.19 ±2.39  4.95 ±2.20 <0.0001  4.67 ±2.50  4.32 ±2.56 <0.0001 Region              Urban 5.48 ±2.57  5.03 ±2.43 <0.0001  4.61 ±2.46  4.37 ±2.57 <0.0001 Rural 5.30 ±2.33  5.08 ±2.14 <0.0001  5.56 ±2.35  5.39 ±2.47 <0.0001 Number of bed 
(means)              
<300 bed 5.16 ±2.33  4.92 ±2.06 <0.0001  4.53 ±2.47  4.13 ±2.49 <0.0001 300~499 bed 5.61 ±2.34  5.76 ±2.37 0.022  5.54 ±2.00  5.29 ±1.86 <0.0001 500~700 bed 5.72 ±2.52  5.22 ±2.38 <0.0001  5.16 ±2.36  5.24 ±2.72 0.347 Total 5.35 ±2.40  5.06 ±2.23 <0.0001  4.85 ±2.46  4.62 ±2.58 <0.0001 
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Table 9 reports average LOS of cases and controls stratified by time period. Among cases, average 
LOS was observed to decrease prior to KDPC implementation and increase after KDPC 
implementation. In contrast, among controls, average LOS consistently decreased both before and 
after the time at which the KDPC system was implemented. Total p-for-trend was significant for both 
cases and controls. When stratified by DRGs, p-for-trend remained significant for cases only. 
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Table.9 Average LOS of case and control by time period (days) 
    2007.1~2008.6   2008.7~2009.6   2009.7~2010.6   2010.7~2011.6   2011.7~2012.6   p for 
 trend 
  2012.7~2013.6   2013.7~2014.6 p for 
 trend*     Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD     Mean SD   Mean SD 
Total Case 5.64 ±2.36  5.45 ±2.31  5.28 ±2.43  5.14 ±2.43  5.09 ±2.46  <0.0001  4.98 ±2.16  5.14 ±2.30 <0.0001 
  Control 5.00 ±2.51  4.88 ±2.37  4.83 ±2.45  4.79 ±2.51  4.68 ±2.45  0.0151  4.64 ±2.57  4.60 ±2.59 0.0275 
Appendectomy Case 5.96 ±2.27  5.78 ±2.19  5.71 ±2.36  5.60 ±2.25  5.59 ±2.27  0.0062  5.56 ±2.07  5.67 ±2.16 0.0183 
  Control 5.78 ±2.39  5.65 ±2.22  5.63 ±2.37  5.66 ±2.42  5.52 ±2.38  0.0869  5.60 ±2.52  5.57 ±2.53 0.1961 
Hernia procedures Case 5.43 ±2.34  5.16 ±2.19  4.87 ±2.05  4.66 ±2.38  4.37 ±1.95  <0.0001  4.20 ±1.96  4.56 ±2.42 0.0003 
  Control 4.01 ±2.24  3.90 ±2.17  4.02 ±2.20  3.79 ±2.27  3.83 ±2.19  0.3046  3.49 ±2.19  3.52 ±2.36 0.2593 
Hemorrhoid procedures Case 4.91 ±2.44  4.66 ±2.53  4.32 ±2.52  4.30 ±2.63  4.23 ±2.95  0.0261  4.05 ±2.02  4.10 ±2.11 0.0001 
  Control 3.27 ±1.82  3.12 ±1.65  3.12 ±1.62  3.12 ±1.62  3.10 ±1.71  0.2028  3.08 ±1.66  2.96 ±1.55 0.0774 
*for total duration (2007.1~2014.6) 
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1. Results of segmented regression analysis of interrupted time series with control 
 
Table 10 reports the results of the segmented regression analysis with control for case and control 
LOS. The estimate for Baseline trend in difference between cases and controls, -.0007 (p-value 
0.0412), reflects a trend in the difference in LOS between cases and controls prior to KDPC 
implementation. The estimate for Level change in difference between cases and controls reflects a 
difference in the change of LOS between cases and controls at the time of KDPC implementation. As 
reported in Table 10, the difference in LOS between cases and controls was as much as 0.117 days at 
the time of KDPC implementation, but was not statistically significant (p = 0.4366). The estimate for 
Trend change in difference between cases and controls reflects the change in trend difference in LOS 
between cases and controls after implementation. Thus, an estimate of 0.025 indicates that the trend 
difference in LOS between cases and controls was an increase in 0.025 days (p = 0.0055) compared 
with baseline. 
We also performed a comparative interrupted time series analysis (CITS, trend-adjusted difference-
in-difference analysis) using Equation S1. The results of this analysis are reported in Table S8. 
Furthermore, using Equation S3 we predicted changes in LOS 12, 24, 36, and 48 months after KDPC 
implementation. These results are reported in Table S13 and Figure S3. 
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Table 10. Results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS 
Parameter Estimate SE 95% Confidence Limits p-value 
Intercept β   3.164 0.367 2.445 3.883 <.0001 
Baseline trend   -0.002 0.004 -0.010 0.005 0.5827 
Level change   -0.012 0.061 -0.132 0.108 0.8450 
Trend change   -0.004 0.006 -0.016 0.009 0.5877 
Difference between case and control 0.186 0.268 -0.339 0.711 0.4872 
Baseline trend of difference between case and control -0.007 0.003 -0.014 0.000 0.0412 
Level change of difference between case and control -0.117 0.150 -0.412 0.178 0.4366 
Trend change of difference between case and control 0.025 0.009 0.008 0.043 0.0055 
Age   0.016 0.002 0.013 0.018 <.0001 
Sex Male -0.099 0.019 -0.136 -0.063 <.0001 
Female ref.         
Sub DRG G081 3.922 0.223 3.485 4.360 <.0001 
G082 1.154 0.144 0.872 1.435 <.0001 
G083 2.896 0.390 2.132 3.661 <.0001 
G084 0.906 0.154 0.604 1.207 <.0001 
G095 -0.463 0.307 -1.064 0.138 0.1308 
G096 -0.077 0.200 -0.469 0.316 0.7028 
G097 -0.606 0.357 -1.304 0.093 0.0895 
G098 0.216 0.331 -0.432 0.865 0.5129 
G102 0.146 0.082 -0.016 0.307 0.0766 
G104 -1.058 0.171 -1.393 -0.722 <.0001 
G105 -0.347 0.240 -0.818 0.123 0.1477 
G106 ref.         
Charlson comorbidity index 0 -0.163 0.095 -0.350 0.023 0.0858 
1 -0.247 0.087 -0.417 -0.076 0.0047 
2 -0.234 0.076 -0.384 -0.085 0.0021 
3 -0.247 0.050 -0.346 -0.148 <.0001 
≥4 ref.         
Hospital type General Hospital 0.118 0.291 -0.452 0.688 0.6846 
Hospital ref.         
Hospital ownership Public 0.454 0.358 -0.247 1.156 0.2044 
Corporation 0.365 0.277 -0.179 0.909 0.1885 
Private ref.         
Teaching status Teaching 0.584 0.190 0.212 0.955 0.0021 
Non-teaching ref.         
Region Urban -0.034 0.224 -0.472 0.405 0.8808 
Rural ref.         
SEASON Spring -0.049 0.017 -0.083 -0.015 0.0045 
Summer -0.044 0.021 -0.086 -0.003 0.0378 
Autumn -0.038 0.025 -0.086 0.011 0.1275 
Winter ref.         
Year 2007 0.143 0.261 -0.368 0.654 0.5832 
2008 0.118 0.217 -0.307 0.543 0.5849 
2009 0.059 0.194 -0.321 0.438 0.7612 
2010 0.115 0.157 -0.194 0.423 0.4654 
2011 0.059 0.131 -0.197 0.315 0.6509 
2012 -0.020 0.118 -0.252 0.212 0.8634 
2013 0.067 0.064 -0.059 0.193 0.2962 
2014 ref.         
Number of Bed   0.003 0.001 0.002 0.004 <.0001 
Number of doctor   -0.005 0.001 -0.007 -0.003 <.0001 
Number of Nurse   -0.005 0.002 -0.009 -0.002 0.0005 
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Table 11 reports the results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS stratified by 
DRG. The estimate for Trend change in difference between cases and controls is 0.021 (p = 0.0496) 
for appendectomy and 0.040 (p = 0.0058) for hernia procedures. In addition, the estimate for Baseline 
trend in difference between cases and controls is 0.015 (p = 0.0033). No significant estimates were 
found for hemorrhoid procedures. Table S3-S5 reports the full results of segmented regression 
analysis with control for LOS for three surgical DRGs.  
 
Table 11. Results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS by DRG 
Parameter Estimate SE 95% Confidence Limits p-value 
Appendectomy           
Intercept β 5.551 0.535 4.503 6.598 <.0001 
Baseline trend -0.002 0.005 -0.012 0.008 0.6720 
Level change 0.037 0.074 -0.109 0.182 0.6222 
Trend change -0.004 0.009 -0.021 0.013 0.6151 
Difference between case and control 0.042 0.235 -0.419 0.502 0.8598 
Baseline trend of difference between case and control -0.005 0.004 -0.012 0.003 0.2680 
Level change of difference between case and control -0.161 0.176 -0.506 0.184 0.3595 
Trend change of difference between case and control 0.021 0.011 0.000 0.041 0.0496 
Hernia procedures           
Intercept β 0.762 0.743 -0.695 2.219 0.3051 
Baseline trend -0.017 0.008 -0.033 -0.001 0.0376 
Level change -0.129 0.149 -0.421 0.163 0.3862 
Trend change 0.012 0.013 -0.013 0.037 0.3480 
Difference between case and control -0.131 0.407 -0.928 0.666 0.7472 
Baseline trend of difference between case and control -0.015 0.005 -0.025 -0.005 0.0033 
Level change of difference between case and control 0.091 0.218 -0.337 0.519 0.6772 
Trend change of difference between case and control 0.040 0.014 0.011 0.068 0.0058 
Hemorrhoid procedures           
Intercept β 2.734 0.596 1.567 3.902 <.0001 
Baseline trend 0.006 0.007 -0.007 0.019 0.3373 
Level change -0.011 0.091 -0.190 0.168 0.9071 
Trend change -0.012 0.009 -0.030 0.006 0.1837 
Difference between case and control 0.646 0.369 -0.077 1.369 0.0800 
Baseline trend of difference between case and control -0.010 0.006 -0.022 0.002 0.1027 
Level change of difference between case and control -0.196 0.285 -0.755 0.363 0.4914 
Trend change of difference between case and control 0.022 0.017 -0.012 0.055 0.2072 
Adjusted age, sex, CCI, hospital type, hospital ownership, teaching status season, year, number of bed, number of doctor 
and number of nurse 
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The time-series graph in Figure 7 reports average LOS for total admissions stratified by month. Red 
dots represent monthly average LOS for cases and blue dots represent average LOS for controls. The 
red dotted line represents the average standard LOS (4.89 days) for KDPC admissions, and the blue 
dotted line represents the average standard LOS (5.20 days) for DRG admissions. LOS consistently 
decreased among controls, whereas LOS decreased among cases and then increased following KDPC  
implementation.  
Time-series graphs for three surgical DRGs are shown in Figures 7-10. For appendectomy, LOS 
trend lines overlapped between cases and controls (Figure 8). However, after adjusting for 
confounding variables, an increasing trend in LOS was observed after KDPC implementation among 
cases. An increasing trend in LOS among cases after KDPC implementation is more obvious for 
hernia procedures (Figure 9). The trend change is relatively small in hemorrhoid procedures compared 
with other DRGs (Figure 10). 
We also performed the analysis using a negative binomial distribution, as well as a Poisson 
distribution with identity link. These results are reported in Table S14. 
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Figure 7. Time series, surgical DRSs 
 
 
Figure 8. Time series, Appendectomy 
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Figure 9. Time series, Hernia procedures 
 
 
Figure 10. Time series, Hemorrhoid procedures 
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2. Results of subgroup analyses 
 
We performed subgroup analyses to determine which subgroup was more influenced by KDPC 
implementation. Subgroup analyses were performed for total, appendectomy, hernia, and hemorrhoid 
procedures. We used Equation 1 to evaluate statistically significant differences among subgroups. 
Results of subgroup analyses for CCI and hospital type are reported in Tables 12 and 13 and Figures 
11 and 12, respectively.  
Table 12 reports the results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS stratified by 
CCI subgroup. Among total admissions, those with a higher CCI exhibited a higher increasing trend 
change in LOS (CCI 0, 1: 0.022, p = 0.0142; CCI 2, 3: 0.026, p = 0.0288; CCI ≥ 4: 0.055, p = 0.0003). 
Among appendectomy admissions, only the CCI ≥ 4 subgroup exhibited a statistically significant 
estimate for Trend change in difference between cases and controls” (0.077, p = 0.0044). Among 
hernia procedure admissions, all CCI subgroups exhibited a statistically significant increasing trend 
change (CCI 0, 1: 0.033, p = 0.0361; CCI 2, 3: 0.049, p = 0.0045; CCI ≥ 4: 0.043, p = 0.0379). 
Figure 11 shows the estimate values of level and trend changes in the difference between cases and 
controls from Table 12 as a bar graph. 
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Figure 11. Results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS by CCI subgroup 
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Table 12. Results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS by CCI subgroup 
    Level change of difference between Public and private   
Trend change of difference between  
Public and private 
    Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value 
Total 0, 1 -0.163 0.150 0.2794  0.022 0.009 0.0142 2, 3 -0.148 0.204 0.4690  0.026 0.012 0.0288 
≥4 0.161 0.221 0.4664  0.055 0.015 0.0003 Appendectomy 0, 1 -0.181 0.169 0.2855  0.019 0.010 0.0608 2, 3 -0.068 0.254 0.7891  0.018 0.016 0.2422 ≥4 -0.270 0.563 0.6308  0.077 0.027 0.0044 Hernia procedures 0, 1 -0.038 0.263 0.8844  0.033 0.016 0.0361 2, 3 -0.021 0.312 0.9465  0.049 0.017 0.0045 ≥4 0.243 0.286 0.3965  0.043 0.021 0.0379 Hemorrhoid procedures 0, 1 -0.179 0.282 0.5254  0.021 0.016 0.1927 2, 3 -0.329 0.357 0.3556  0.012 0.021 0.5545 
≥4 -0.289 0.436 0.5072  0.066 0.037 0.0721 
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Table 13 reports the results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS by hospital 
type subgroup. Among total admissions, the estimate for Trend change in difference between cases 
and controls was significant for the general hospital subgroup (0.030, p = 0.0048). Similarly, for 
appendectomy admissions, the estimate for Trend change in difference between cases and controls 
was statistically significant for the general hospital subgroup only (0.024, p = 0.0447). In contrast, for 
hernia procedures, the trend change estimates for both the general hospital and hospital subgroups 
were statistically significant (general hospital: 0.043, p =0.0091; hospital: -0.125, p = < 0.001). 
Significant level changes in difference between cases and controls were also observed for hernia 
procedures among the hospital subtype (2.589, p = 0.0285) and for hemorrhoid procedures among the 
general hospital subtype (-1.086, p = 0.0006). 
Figure 12 reports the estimate values for level and trend changes in the difference between cases and 
controls from Table 13 as a bar graph. 
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Table 13. Results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS by hospital type 
subgroup 
    Level change of difference Public and private   
Trend change of difference 
Public and private 
    Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value 
Total General 
hospital -0.097 0.163 0.5512 
 
0.030 0.011 0.0048 
  Hospital -0.398 0.408 0.3291 
 
0.010 0.023 0.6513 
Appendectomy General hospital -0.094 0.183 0.6082 
 
0.024 0.012 0.0447 
  Hospital -0.668 0.488 0.1709 
 
0.024 0.019 0.1982 
Hernia procedures General hospital -0.089 0.225 0.6938 
 
0.043 0.017 0.0091 
  Hospital 2.589 1.182 0.0285 
 
-0.125 0.029 <.0001 
Hemorrhoid procedures General hospital -1.086 0.318 0.0006 
 
-0.004 0.024 0.8645 
  Hospital -0.307 0.352 0.3830 
 
0.030 0.020 0.1277 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS by hospital type 
subgroup 
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We also conducted segmented regression analysis with control for LOS by region and teaching 
status. These results are reported in the Appendix in Tables S6 and S7 and Figures S1 and S2. In 
addition, we performed comparative interrupted time-series analysis (i.e., trend-adjusted difference-
in-difference [DID] analysis) and trend-adjusted triple difference-in-difference analysis using 
Equations S1 and S2, respectively. The results of these analyses are reported in Tables S9-S12. 
Furthermore, using Equation S3, we predicted an LOS change effect at 12, 24, 36, and 48 months 
after KDPC implementation by subgroups. These results are reported in Tables S14-S17 and Figures 
S4-S7. 
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VI. Discussion 
 
 
1. Discussion of study methods 
 
There are obvious differences between case and control hospitals in this study. Hospitals in the case 
hospital group are all public hospitals that were forced into participating in the DRG pilot project for 
political reasons, whereas hospitals in the control hospital group are all private hospitals. Differences 
between public and private hospital are well known58. In addition, the results of this study suggest a 
significant difference in LOS between these two hospital groups. Average LOS was 5.28 days (± 2.36 
days) among case hospitals and 4.80 days (± 2.50 days) among control hospitals, which indicates that 
a direct comparison between groups is meaningless. Therefore, we conducted a time series analysis 
before and after implementation With control group.  
Previous studies that analyzed the impact of policy changes mainly used the DID 59-61 and time-
series62-66 methods. In this study, the effect of the new payment system was identified by segmented 
regression analysis of an interrupted time series with control. Interrupted time-series analysis is a 
popular method for policy evaluation67-71. Most studies using segmented analysis have analyzed time-
aggregated data without considering individual-level effects. In contrast, a study by Sen et al.72 used 
segmented regression analysis with data aggregated into “person-months.” The present study 
implemented segmented regression analysis based on the method by Sen et al. to overcome limitations 
in the unadjusted case-mix that is present in most studies. In addition, we used a GEE model, which 
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provides a flexible approach to analyze correlated data from the same individuals over time73,74. The 
main limitation of a mixed-model approach is the assumption of residual normality75,76. Recent studies 
have used a regression method to adjust individual variables77,78. However, the GEE is comparable for 
a continuous dependent variable79. Thus, the study results were interpreted based on the GEE.  
We analyzed the change in average LOS over the 2 years after KDPC implementation (Table S8). In 
the time-series graph in Figure 7, a decreasing trend is observed in both the cases and controls until 
the time of KDPC implementation. After this point, an increase in average LOS is observed in the 
cases (V-shaped time-series graph, Figure 7). Therefore, it is difficult to determine the effect on LOS 
change from average LOS over a particular period.  
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2. Discussion of results 
 
The results of this study suggest that the payment system change from DRG to KDPC increased 
LOS. However, this effect was not consistent across three surgical DRGs and was significant for 
appendectomy and hernia procedures only. Compared with the other two surgical DRGs, hemorrhoid 
procedures are relatively non-invasive, LOS is usually short, emergency procedures or complex cases 
are relatively rare, and the level of surgical difficulty is low (based on the relative value resource 
based scale, RVRBS). Although we cannot conclude that these characteristics contributed to the result 
observed in the current study, we cannot conceive of other reasons for differences. If the difference is 
associated with DRG invasiveness, then the severity of admission may also have a similar association 
with the impact.  
The results of stratified analysis by severity (i.e., CCI) are consistent with this expectation. The 
impact of the payment system change on the trend change in LOS is twice as high in the highest 
severity group (CCI ≥ 4: 0.055) compared with the lowest severity group (CCI 0, 1: 0.022). This 
result is observed for each DRG subtype in the stratified analysis by severity degree. This association 
is also observed for the hospital type subgroup analysis. General hospitals are larger than hospitals. In 
addition, more patient cases are generally admitted to general hospitals. Therefore, our hypothesis that 
the payment system change would have more of an impact on high severity cases (or complex 
procedures) is appropriate. 
It is unclear, however, why LOS among more severe cases is more susceptible to payment system 
change. The transition from a DRG- to KDPC-based payment system reduces the incentive to 
decrease LOS. According to Ishii53, the fee schedule structure of DRG provides more incentives for 
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decreasing LOS than the Japanese DPC. Given that the fee schedule structure of KDPC is very similar 
to the original Japanese DPC, we can infer that incentives to decrease LOS are attenuated in the 
KDPC-based system.  
Despite the attenuated incentives for decreasing LOS in the KDPC compared with the DRG, the 
structure of the KDPC fee schedule is per diem, with profit maximized for shorter LOS. Therefore, an 
increase in LOS due to a change in the payment system means that the payment system change also is 
associated with profit minimization. There exists, therefore, a tradeoff between decreasing LOS and 
profit maximization between the DRG- and KDPC-based payment systems. The impact of this 
tradeoff is the greatest for high severity admission cases. Although it is difficult to define what an 
appropriate LOS is, the fact that LOS increased only in high severity cases suggests that the DRG 
system provides excessive incentives to reduce LOS for high severity cases. 
This increase in LOS should be interpreted differently than the LOS decrease that was observed 
following the payment system change from FFS to DRG. Under FFS, long LOS is associated with 
profit maximization, whereas long LOS is associated with a decrease in average profits under KDCP. 
Therefore, increasing LOS in the present study suggests that the DRG-based system promotes 
excessive decreases in LOS in certain situations in Korea. 
There are several reasons for the observation of LOS decrease under DRG but not KDPC. First, the 
financial incentives for LOS decrease are higher for DRG than KDPC. In Figure 7, the blue dotted 
line, which represents the standard average LOS for DRG, was located above the blue dot that 
represents the real average LOS for that month. This finding indicates that money was saved under the 
DRG-based system, because the DRG fee schedule is designed to compensate costs during standard 
LOS. Despite these savings, however, average LOS continuously decreases under the DRG-based 
42 
system. In contrast, the red dotted line, which represents the average standard LOS for three surgical 
DRGs under the KDCP-based system, is located mainly below the red dots during the KDPC period 
(2012.7-2014. 6). KDPC admissions with LOS longer than the standard LOS incur a financial penalty 
due to the decreasing per-diem fee schedule. Despite this penalty, we observed that average LOS 
increases under the KDPC-based system. If LOS increase is due to financial incentives, then LOS 
should not increase over the standard LOS. Therefore, differences in financial incentives alone cannot 
explain the results of our study.  
A second possible explanation is the contribution of “checks and balances”. “Checks and balances” 
refers to the balance between the medical decisions of the physicians and the pressure of the hospital 
manager. Unlike in the U.S., physicians’ fees and hospital fees are not separate in Korea. In addition, 
the medical fees of the NHI are relatively low compared with the U.S. Therefore, the physician’s 
decision has less of an impact than the manager’s decision. Thus, in contrast to FFS or a per-diem fee 
schedule, which give more power to the physician’s professional decision, checks and balances are 
more difficult to achieve under a DRG-based system80,81. Checks and balances may be easier to 
achieve under KDPC due to structural differences in the payment system. However, Kwon insists that 
a checks and balances structure is meaningless in Korea, because most physicians are employed by 
the hospital and there are few checks and balances between the hospital and the physician in terms of 
quality, which is in contrast to the attending system in the U.S.8. Therefore, to identify the existence 
and action of checks and balances in Korea, other indexes about health care outcomes or processes, 
such as spending resources and mortality, should be investigated in future studies. 
We performed CITS analysis and trend-adjusted triple difference-in-difference analysis. CITS 
compares the average over a particular period; therefore, differences may be masked when the trend 
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change is slight and comparing period is not long enough. However, the results from this CITS 
analysis were not significantly different from the results of segmented regression analysis (Tables S8-
S12).  
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3. Discussion about payment system and LOS 
 
This study aimed to compare two bundled payment systems to provide evidence for the 
development of a proper reimbursement system in Korea. The findings from this study suggest that 
the DRG-based payment system provides too much incentive to decrease LOS for high severity cases. 
Average LOS in Korea is the second longest among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries after Japan. Short LOS is therefore a high priority public health 
problem. However, it is doubtful that a change in payment system that only reduces the LOS, and 
does not have any other benefit, is an appropriate choice.  
 The impact of payment system on medical services and supplies is well known1-3. Figure 1 shows 
that larger payment units are associated with more provider financial risk as well as risk of patient 
undertreatment. However, increase in patient undertreatment risk is not directly associated with LOS 
decrease. Previous studies are counterexamples36-38. In those studies, the payment system changed to 
DRG from a budgeting system, which may explain the cost component shown in Figure 2. There are 
Incentives under FFS when costs and the number of processes (numerator of FFS component) are 
reduced and the number of services (payment unit) are expanded. Because LOS is one of the “number 
of services”, therefore, reducing LOS has not incentive under FFS. Under case payment, there are 
incentives when cost, number of processes, and number of services (numerator of case payment) are 
reduced and the number of case (payment unit) are expanded. So, under case payment, reducing LOS 
has incentives. Similarly, under episode-of-care payment, there are incenteives when costs, number of 
processes, number of services, and number of case (numerator of episode-of-care payment) are 
reduced and the number of episodes of care (payment unit) are expanded. And under full capitation, 
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there are incentives when costs, number of processes, number of services, number of case, number of 
episodes of care, and number of conditions (numerator of full capitation) are reduced. In the case of 
full capitation, incentive points disperse to each component. Therefore, under full capitation, the 
incentive for LOS decrease is relatively weak compared with the episode-of-care payment system. 
The incentive for LOS decrease is not stronger in a larger payment unit system. The incentive is 
strongest under a DRG system.  
In contrast, although KDPC is a per-diem based payment system, there is also incentive to decrease 
LOS under KDPC because its fee schedule is designed to provide more incentives during the early 
admission period. Compared to DRG, the incentive scale of KDPC is relatively small due to the FFS 
component. Therefore, the incentive for LOS decrease is not as strong for KDPC compared with DRG. 
However, KDPC may be sufficient for reducing LOS comprehensively in Korea, if LOS reduction is 
not the sole purpose for a payment system change. 
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4. Limitations 
 
This study has several limitations. First, case hospitals included only public (and quasi-public) 
hospitals and control hospitals included only private hospitals. To minimize this problem, we used 
time-series analysis and sampled individuals using propensity score matching.  
Second, we did not assess other factors that may be affected by the payment system change, such as 
costs or supplied services, due to lack of data. KDPC fee schedule includes more expensive services 
that are not included in the DRG schedule. Therefore, comparing claim costs only between KDPC and 
DRG is meaningless. However, LOS is an index that reflects medical service supply. Given that the 
aim of this study was to compare two bundled payment systems to provide evidence for the 
development of an appropriate reimbursement system, we think that LOS may be an appropriate and 
sufficient dependent variable for this study. 
Finally, we analyzed only three surgical DRGs. More DRGs, especially medical DRGs, should be 
explored in future studies. The results of this study provide important evidence regarding the impact 
of payment system change on surgical DRGs. 
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VII. Conclusion 
 
 
Average LOS for surgical DRG admissions increased following payment system change from DRG 
to KDPC. This LOS increase was observed specifically for complex procedure admissions and high 
severity cases. Although both payment systems are optimized to decrease LOS, incentives to reduce 
LOS are stronger under the DRG system than the KDPC system. Therefore, these findings suggest 
that incentives under the DRG lead to excessive LOS decrease in Korea.  
Further increases in medical spending are expected due to the aging population, development of new 
medical technology, and higher standards of living. A provider-side cost-sharing payment system will 
be introduced in the future, because payment system changes have been met with low resistance by 
patients, and have introduced few burdens compared to other policy changes. We have already 
implemented DRG and KDPC, and the new payment system, which is based on these two bundled 
payment systems, is expected to be the next national payment system in Korea. A change in the 
national payment system should be undertaken with caution because enrollment of all medical 
institutions in the NHI is compulsory. We suggest that policymakers and stakeholders should focus on 
the development of an appropriate reimbursement system that focuses on more than cost containment, 
saving resources, or LOS reduction. More evidence and studies that focus on associations between 
payment systems and medical outcomes, resource spending, and quality will be needed to achieve this 
goal.  
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Appendix A. General characteristics of admissions before and after Propensity 
Score Matching
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Table S1. General characteristics of admissions before Propensity Score Matching (n, %) 
  
Variables Before Intervention, 2007.1~2012.6   p-value   After Intervention, 2012.7~2014.6   p-value Case   Control     Case   Control   
Length of Stay (mean, SD) 5.42 2.47  3.63 1.92  <0.0001          5.15       2.33           3.38       1.86   <0.0001 
Age (mean, SD) 41.2 21.7  41.2 15.6   0.0064          43.70      21.60          42.70     16.00   <0.0001 
<10         1,546  5.6         7,007  2.0  <0.0001           403         4.1          1,824         1.5   <0.0001 
10~19         4,511  16.4       19,146  5.4           1,417       14.4          6,436         5.1    
20~29         3,413  12.4       55,995  15.9           1,091       11.1        18,628       14.8    
30~39         3,779  13.7       80,962  23.0           1,300       13.2        27,854       22.2    
40~49         3,983  14.5       82,871  23.5           1,485       15.1        17,644       22.0    
50~59         3,630  13.2       60,649  17.2           1,528       15.6        23,833       19.0    
60~67         3,396  13.3       31,183  8.9           1,102       11.2        12,342         9.8    
>=70         3,284  11.9       14,303  4.1           1,496       15.2          6,991         5.6    
Sex       <0.0001        <0.0001 
Male        17,374  63.1     199,262  56.6           6,225       62.4        72,886       58.0    
Female        10,168  36.9     152,854  43.4           3,597       36.6        52,666       42.0    
Principal diagnosis       <0.0001        <0.0001 
Appendectomy        17,370  63.1       47,327  13.4           6,114       62.3        15,546       12.4    
Hernia procedures         4,380  15.9       20,479  5.8           1,609       16.4          8,684         6.9    
Hemorrhoid procedures         5,792  21.0     284,310  80.7           2,099       21.4      101,322       80.7    
Charson comorbidity index       <0.0001        <0.0001 
0        13,221  48.0     162,924  46.3           4,195       42.7        54,686       43.6    
1         4,348  15.8       90,880  25.8           1,639       16.7        30,283       24.1    
2         3,555  12.9       56,447  16.0           1,458       14.8        22,702       18.1    
3         3,334  12.1       28,789  8.2           1,101       11.2        11,605         9.2    
≥4         3,084  11.2       13,076  3.7           1,429       14.6          6,276         5.0    
Season       <0.0001        <0.0001 
Spring         7,568  27.5         2,502  25.5         92,430       26.3        29,857       23.8    
Summer         7,276  26.4         2,635  26.8         84,073       23.9        31,244       24.9    
Autumn         5,737  20.8         2,218  22.6         71,741       20.4        28,811       23.0    
Winter         6,961  25.3         2,467  25.1       103,872       29.5        35,640       28.4    
Period       <0.0001         
2007.1~2008.6         7,615  27.7       95,177  27.0           
2008.7~2009.6         4,996  18.1       62,930  17.9           
2009.7~2010.6         5,191  18.9       63,215  18.0           
2010.7~2011.6         4,659  16.9       64,781  18.4           
2011.7~2012.6         5,081  18.5       66,013  18.8           
2012.7~2013.6                4,749  48.4       63,863       50.9   <0.0001 
2013.7~2014.6                        5,073  51.7        61,689       49.1      
Total        27,542  70.0      352,116  73.7               9,822  30.0      125,552  26.3      
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Table S2. General characteristics of admissions after Propensity Score Matching (n, %) 
Variables Before Intervention, 2007.1~2012.6   p-value   After Intervention, 2012.7~2014.6   p-value Case   Control     Case   Control   
Length of Stay (mean, SD) 5.35 2.40  4.85 2.46  0.0003  5.06 2.23  4.62 2.6  <0.0001 
Age (mean, SD) 40.2 21.2  39.6 21.0  <0.0001  42.7 21.2  43.7 21.1  <0.0001 
<10 1,546 5.8  3,505 6.4  0.0002  754 4.2  403 4.2  <0.0001 
10~19 4,511 16.8  9,082 16.7    2,531 14.0  1,417 14.9   
20~29 3,413 12.8  6,967 12.8    1,951 10.8  1,091 11.5   
30~39 3,779 14.1  7,704 14.2    2,245 12.4  1,300 13.7   
40~49 3,981 14.9  8,200 15.1    2,785 15.4  1,484 15.6   
50~59 3,620 13.5  7,464 13.7    3,113 17.2  1,523 16.0   
60~67 3,234 12.1  6,534 12.0    2,311 12.8  1,034 10.9   
>=70 2,661 10.0  4,935 9.1    2,399 13.3  1,243 13.1   
Sex       0.0002        <0.0001 
Male 16,815 62.9  34,932 64.2    5,983 63.0  11,826 65.4   
Female 9,930 37.1  19,459 35.8    3,512 37.0  6,263 34.6   
Principal diagnosis       0.0460        0.0095 
Appendectomy 16,573 62.0  34,185 62.9    5,787 61.0  10,682 59.1   
Hernia procedures 4,380 16.4  8,649 15.9    1,609 17.0  3,207 17.7   
Hemorrhoid procedures 5,792 21.7  11,557 21.3    2,099 22.0  4,200 23.2   
Charson comorbidity index       0.0061        <0.0001 
0 13,221 49.4  27,221 50.1    4,195 44.2  7,472 41.3   
1 4,348 16.3  8,932 16.4    1,639 17.3  3,062 16.9   
2 3,555 13.3  7,334 13.5    1,458 15.4  3,050 16.9   
3 3,187 11.9  6,358 11.7    1,041 11.0  2,281 11.6   
≥4 2,434 9.1  4,546 8.4    1,162 12.0  2,224 12.3   
Season       0.2007        0.9392 
Spring 7,347 27.5  15,204 28.0    2,413 25.4  4,649 25.7   
Summer 7,058 26.4  14,015 25.8    2,559 27.0  4,836 26.7   
Autumn 5,553 20.8  11,412 21.0    2,154 22.7  4,121 22.8   
Winter 6,787 25.4  13,760 25.3    2,369 25.0  4,483 24.8   
Period       0.0004         
2007.1~2008.6 7,435 27.8  15,506 28.5           
2008.7~2009.6 4,855 18.2  10,194 18.7           
2009.7~2010.6 5,007 18.7  9,867 18.1           
2010.7~2011.6 4,513 16.9  9,330 17.2           
2011.7~2012.6 4,935 18.5  9,494 17.5           
2012.7~2013.6         4,589 48.3  8,865 49.0  0.2852 
2013.7~2014.6         4,906 51.7  9,224 51.0   
Total 26,745 73.8  54,391 75.0    9,495 26.2  18,089 25.0   
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Appendix B. Results of the segmented regression analysis of DRGs  
 
Table S3. Results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS of Appendectomy 
Parameter Estimate SE 95% Confidence Limits p-value 
Intercept b   5.551 0.535 4.503 6.598 <.0001 
Baseline trend   -0.002 0.005 -0.012 0.008 0.672 
Level change   0.037 0.074 -0.109 0.182 0.6222 
Trend change   -0.004 0.009 -0.021 0.013 0.6151 
Difference  between Public and private   0.042 0.235 -0.419 0.502 0.8598 
Baseline trend of difference between case and control   -0.005 0.004 -0.012 0.003 0.268 
Level change of difference between case and control   -0.161 0.176 -0.506 0.184 0.3595 
Trend change of difference between case and control   0.021 0.011 0.000 0.041 0.0496 
Age   0.006 0.001 0.004 0.009 <.0001 
Sex Male -0.113 0.016 -0.145 -0.081 <.0001 
Female ref.     
Sub DRG G081 3.167 0.139 2.894 3.439 <.0001 
G082 0.399 0.093 0.217 0.581 <.0001 
G083 1.972 0.270 1.443 2.501 <.0001 
G084 ref.     
Charlson comorbidity index 0 -0.905 0.101 -1.102 -0.708 <.0001 
1 -0.877 0.094 -1.062 -0.693 <.0001 
2 -0.752 0.087 -0.923 -0.580 <.0001 
3 -0.637 0.075 -0.784 -0.490 <.0001 
≥4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 
Hospital type General 
H it l 
-0.079 0.325 -0.716 0.559 0.8083 
Hospital ref.     
Hospital ownership Public 0.091 0.336 -0.566 0.749 0.7860 
Corporation 0.055 0.263 -0.460 0.570 0.8340 
Private ref.     
Teaching status Teaching 0.474 0.187 0.107 0.841 0.0113 
Non-teaching ref.     
Region Urban -0.046 0.235 -0.506 0.415 0.8461 
Rural ref.     
Season Spring -0.062 0.024 -0.108 -0.016 0.0087 
Summer -0.011 0.025 -0.059 0.038 0.6576 
Autumn -0.032 0.032 -0.095 0.030 0.3099 
Winter ref.     
Year 2007 -0.116 0.355 -0.811 0.580 0.7446 
2008 -0.140 0.293 -0.714 0.433 0.6316 
2009 -0.138 0.250 -0.628 0.352 0.5808 
2010 0.013 0.218 -0.415 0.441 0.9534 
2011 -0.012 0.181 -0.368 0.343 0.9454 
2012 -0.076 0.158 -0.385 0.234 0.6328 
2013 0.046 0.087 -0.125 0.217 0.5996 
2014 ref.     
Number of Bed   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.0006 
Number of doctor   -0.004 0.001 -0.006 -0.002 <.0001 
Number of Nurse   -0.005 0.002 -0.008 -0.002 0.0010 
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Table S4. Results of the segmented regression analysis with control for of Hernia procedures 
Parameter Estimate SE 95% Confidence Limits p-value 
Intercept b  0.762 0.743 -0.695 2.219 0.3051 
Baseline trend  -0.017 0.008 -0.033 -0.001 0.0376 
Level change  -0.129 0.149 -0.421 0.163 0.3862 
Trend change  0.012 0.013 -0.013 0.037 0.348 
Difference  between Public and private  -0.131 0.407 -0.928 0.666 0.7472 
Baseline trend of difference between case and control  -0.015 0.005 -0.025 -0.005 0.0033 
Level change of difference between case and control  0.091 0.218 -0.337 0.519 0.6772 
Trend change of difference between case and control  0.040 0.014 0.011 0.068 0.0058 
Age  0.055 0.006 0.044 0.066 <.0001 Sex Male -0.056 0.061 -0.175 0.062 0.3525 
Female ref.     Sub DRG G095 -0.716 0.331 -1.365 -0.067 0.0306 
G096 -0.484 0.146 -0.771 -0.197 0.0009 
G097 -0.734 0.390 -1.499 0.031 0.0601 
G098 ref.     Charlson comorbidity index 0 1.933 0.250 1.443 2.423 <.0001 
1 1.373 0.192 0.996 1.749 <.0001 
2 0.859 0.132 0.600 1.119 <.0001 
3 0.343 0.074 0.198 0.488 <.0001 
≥4 ref.     Hospital type General 
Hospital 0.033 0.412 -0.775 0.841 0.9362 
Hospital ref.     Hospital ownership Public 1.982 0.543 0.919 3.045 0.0003 
Corporation 1.373 0.471 0.449 2.297 0.0036 
Private ref.     Teaching status Teaching 0.703 0.392 -0.065 1.471 0.0728 
Non-teaching ref.     Region Urban 0.037 0.300 -0.551 0.625 0.9012 
Rural ref.     Season Spring 0.001 0.053 -0.102 0.104 0.9912 
Summer -0.069 0.049 -0.165 0.027 0.1589 
Autumn 0.072 0.053 -0.032 0.176 0.1729 
Winter ref.     Year 2007 -0.550 0.533 -1.594 0.494 0.3017 
2008 -0.423 0.450 -1.305 0.460 0.3477 
2009 -0.334 0.381 -1.080 0.412 0.3806 
2010 -0.160 0.290 -0.729 0.409 0.5819 
2011 -0.136 0.228 -0.582 0.311 0.5516 
2012 -0.085 0.201 -0.479 0.309 0.6719 
2013 -0.006 0.123 -0.247 0.235 0.9609 
2014 ref.     Number of Bed  0.003 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.0002 Number of doctor  -0.007 0.002 -0.011 -0.004 <.0001 Number of Nurse  -0.004 0.002 -0.009 0.000 0.0688 
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Table S5. Results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS of Anal procedures 
Parameter Estimate SE 95% Confidence Limits p-value 
Intercept b   2.734 0.596 1.567 3.902 <.0001 
Baseline trend   0.006 0.007 -0.007 0.019 0.3373 
Level change   -0.011 0.091 -0.190 0.168 0.9071 
Trend change   -0.012 0.009 -0.030 0.006 0.1837 
Difference  between Public and private   0.646 0.369 -0.077 1.369 0.0800 
Baseline trend of difference between case and control   -0.010 0.006 -0.022 0.002 0.1027 
Level change of difference between case and control   -0.196 0.285 -0.755 0.363 0.4914 
Trend change of difference between case and control   0.022 0.017 -0.012 0.055 0.2072 
Age   0.004 0.003 -0.002 0.010 0.2239 
Sex Male -0.130 0.036 -0.201 -0.060 0.0003 
Female ref.         
Sub DRG G102 0.195 0.075 0.049 0.341 0.0089 
G104 -1.087 0.157 -1.395 -0.779 <.0001 
G105 -0.263 0.303 -0.857 0.330 0.3846 
G106 ref.         
Charlson comorbidity index 0 -0.314 0.141 -0.590 -0.038 0.0257 
1 -0.244 0.111 -0.461 -0.027 0.0277 
2 -0.195 0.096 -0.382 -0.008 0.0412 
3 -0.209 0.080 -0.366 -0.052 0.0092 
≥4 ref.         
Hospital type General 
Hospital 
-0.832 0.288 -1.397 -0.268 0.0039 
Hospital ref.         
Hospital ownership Public 1.555 0.444 0.684 2.426 0.0005 
Corporation 1.008 0.404 0.216 1.801 0.0126 
Private ref.         
Teaching status Teaching 0.950 0.333 0.298 1.603 0.0043 
Non-teaching ref.         
Region Urban 0.159 0.238 -0.307 0.626 0.5034 
Rural ref.         
SEASON Spring -0.050 0.039 -0.127 0.027 0.2037 
Summer -0.101 0.046 -0.190 -0.012 0.0269 
Autumn -0.064 0.050 -0.163 0.034 0.2004 
Winter ref.         
Year 2007 0.665 0.505 -0.325 1.654 0.1878 
2008 0.563 0.431 -0.282 1.409 0.1914 
2009 0.335 0.354 -0.358 1.029 0.3436 
2010 0.211 0.278 -0.335 0.757 0.4484 
2011 0.126 0.231 -0.327 0.580 0.5850 
2012 0.002 0.166 -0.324 0.328 0.9919 
2013 0.025 0.102 -0.175 0.224 0.8078 
2014 ref.         
Number of Bed   0.004 0.002 0.001 0.008 0.0239 
Number of doctor   -0.003 0.005 -0.012 0.006 0.4741 
Number of Nurse   -0.006 0.004 -0.014 0.002 0.1311 
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Appendix C. Results of region and teaching status sub-group analysis  
 
 
 
Table S6. Results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS by region 
subgroup 
    Level change of difference case and control   
Trend change of difference 
case and control 
    Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value 
Total Urban -0.560 0.180 0.0018  0.045 0.015 0.0017 
  Rural 0.134 0.194 0.4895  0.017 0.013 0.2031 
Appendectomy Urban -0.403 0.269 0.1344  0.044 0.012 0.0003 
  Rural 0.053 0.227 0.8149  0.014 0.014 0.3429 
Hernia procedures Urban -0.191 0.180 0.2878  0.063 0.025 0.0099 
  Rural 0.000 0.271 0.9993  0.029 0.018 0.0965 
Hemorrhoid procedures Urban -1.717 0.474 0.0003  0.009 0.038 0.8242 
  Rural 0.324 0.287 0.2584  0.018 0.017 0.3101 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure S1. Results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS by region 
subgroup 
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Figure S2. Results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS by teaching status 
subgroup 
 
  
-0.080
-0.060
-0.040
-0.020
0.000
0.020
0.040
0.060
0.080
Total Appendectomy Hernia
procedures
Hemorrhoid
procedures
Teaching
Non-
teaching
Table S7. Results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS by 
Teaching status subgroup 
    Level change of difference   case and control   
Trend change of difference   
case and control 
    Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value 
Total Teaching -0.542 0.211 0.0103   0.018 0.016 0.2633 
  Non-
teaching 0.041 0.173 0.8128   0.030 0.012 0.0106 
Appendectomy Teaching -0.527 0.272 0.0522   0.022 0.019 0.2405 
  Non-
teaching 0.006 0.214 0.9763   0.023 0.013 0.0857 
Hernia procedures Teaching -0.380 0.265 0.1508   0.023 0.022 0.2981 
  Non-
teaching 0.258 0.259 0.3189   0.055 0.018 0.0021 
Hemorrhoid procedures Teaching -0.527 0.966 0.5856   -0.063 0.047 0.1786 
  Non-
teaching -0.082 0.286 0.7753   0.039 0.016 0.0129 
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Appendix D. Statistical method 
 
 
Our CITS (trend adjusted DID) equation was in Equation S1: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = α0 + 𝛽0𝐾𝑖𝐶𝑡 + 𝜙0𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆0𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 × 𝐾𝑖𝐶𝑡𝑖 +  𝛼1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎 1 𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐾𝑖𝐶𝑡× 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎 1𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎 2𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐾𝑖𝐶𝑡 × 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎 2𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡+ 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇1𝑖𝑡𝑍1 + ⋯  + 𝜇𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑍𝑝 + 𝑡𝑖𝑡 ⋯ (𝛿1) 
 
Yht: Average length of stay for hospital h of month t  
i: each patient 
t: time period (month) 
timet: a continuous variable started in January 2007 by month 
time after 1 yeart: a binary variable (1 from 2012.7 to 2013.6; 0 else)  
time after 2 yeart: a binary variable (1 from 2013.7 to 2014.6; 0 else) 
Casei: a binary variable (0 Control hospitals; 1 Case hospitals) 
Seasont: seasonality (spring, summer, autumn, winter) 
𝜇𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑍𝑝: independent variables (1⋯p) 
e  it = Random variation in length of stay across time within hospital (within hospital variation)  
 
In equation S1, β1 could be interpreted as average difference between LOS of admission paid by 
KDPC and LOS of admission paid by DRG in first year after KDPC implementation. Withal, β2 
presents average difference of them in second year after KDPC implementation. 
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And CITS with subgroup (trend adjusted triple DID) equation was in Equation S2: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = α0 + 𝛽0𝐾𝑖𝐶𝑡𝑖 + 𝜙0𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆0𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 × 𝐾𝑖𝐶𝑡𝑖 +  𝛼1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎 1 𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐾𝑖𝐶𝑡× 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎 1𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎 2𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐾𝑖𝐶𝑡 × 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎 2𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡 +Subgroup𝑖 × (𝛽3𝐾𝑖𝐶𝑡𝑖 + 𝜙1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 × 𝐾𝑖𝐶𝑡𝑖 +  𝛼3𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎 1 𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐾𝑖𝐶𝑡× 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎 1𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎 2𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐾𝑖𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎 2𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡) +𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇1𝑖𝑡𝑍1 + ⋯  + 𝜇𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑍𝑝 + 𝑡𝑖𝑡 ⋯ (𝛿2) 
 
Subgroupi: subgroup categories (0: reference; 1,2..) 
 
In equation S2, β4 could be interpreted as average difference of LOS difference (between case and 
control) among subgroup in first year after KDPC implementation. Withal, β5 presents it in second 
year after KDPC implementation. 
 
To estimate the effect of KDPC implementation at particular time point, like 12month, 24month, 
36month and 48month after implementation, we used following equation S3. 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡+  𝛽3𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘 +𝛽4𝐾𝑖𝐶𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 × 𝐾𝑖𝐶𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡 × 𝐾𝑖𝐶𝑡𝑖+  𝛽7𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘 × 𝐾𝑖𝐶𝑡𝑖 +𝛽8𝐶𝑡𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇1𝑖𝑡𝑍1 + ⋯  + 𝜇𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑍𝑝 + 𝑡ℎ𝑡 ⋯ (𝛿3) 
 
KDPC implementationt: a binary variable (0 before June 2012; 1 after July 2012) 
time after KDPC implementationt: a continuous variable started in July 2012 
k: estimate time point 
timet: a continuous variable from January 2007 to June 2012. Else k 
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time point after KDPC implementationk: a continuous variable that make k as 0 after July 2012 
 
In the equation S3, β7 presents predicted difference between LOS change of case and LOS change 
of control at particular time point from baseline trend.  
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Appendix E. CITS analysis and trend adjusted triple DID 
 
 
Table S8. LOS change effects from results of CITS analysis 
  Trend adjusted difference   Trend adjusted 
Difference in Difference   Case   Control   
  Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value 
12th month point                       
Total -0.046 0.154 0.7638   0.019 0.100 0.8490   0.044 0.226 0.8447 
Appendectomy -0.028 0.167 0.8679   0.026 0.131 0.8417   -0.028 0.271 0.9183 
Hernia procedures -0.397 0.338 0.2400   -0.018 0.245 0.9423   -0.066 0.390 0.8658 
Hemorrhoid procedures 0.177 0.327 0.5890   0.059 0.162 0.7141   0.040 0.483 0.9346 
24th month point                       
Total 0.079 0.178 0.6567   -0.205 0.120 0.0881   0.491 0.288 0.0878 
Appendectomy 0.030 0.227 0.8967   -0.163 0.185 0.3794   0.353 0.328 0.2809 
Hernia procedures -0.022 0.333 0.9477   -0.324 0.227 0.1530   0.652 0.425 0.1251 
Hemorrhoid procedures 0.163 0.382 0.6708   -0.180 0.102 0.0771   0.479 0.574 0.4043 
1yr average                       
Total -0.051 0.111 0.6479   -0.031 0.054 0.5697   0.030 0.170 0.8618 
Appendectomy -0.044 0.141 0.7531   0.021 0.073 0.7715   -0.029 0.193 0.8825 
Hernia procedures 0.042 0.172 0.8095   -0.053 0.127 0.6799   0.265 0.228 0.2438 
Hemorrhoid procedures -0.140 0.215 0.5160   -0.075 0.068 0.2760   -0.090 0.334 0.7885 
2yr average                       
Total 0.101 0.150 0.5040   0.031 0.078 0.6910   0.280 0.241 0.2447 
Appendectomy 0.078 0.205 0.7038   0.131 0.120 0.2732   0.137 0.276 0.6201 
Hernia procedures 0.042 0.172 0.8095   0.095 0.159 0.5516   0.768 0.290 0.0082 
Hemorrhoid procedures -0.122 0.284 0.6673   -0.163 0.098 0.0959   0.184 0.467 0.6936 
Part of Appendectomy*                       
12th month point 0.170 0.106 0.1095   0.085 0.113 0.4557   0.280 0.172 0.1027 
24th month point 0.181 0.195 0.3537   -0.098 0.131 0.4539   0.644 0.279 0.0209 
1yr average 0.025 0.116 0.8274   -0.016 0.052 0.7646   0.212 0.142 0.1352 
2yr average 0.058 0.162 0.7200   0.027 0.084 0.7493   0.402 0.199 0.0432 
*Sub-DRG: R082, R084;  
Adjusted age, sex, CCI, hospital type, hospital ownership, teaching status season, year, number of bed, number of doctor and number  
of nurse 
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Table S9. LOS change effects from results of CITS analysis and trend adjusted triple DID by CCI subgroup 
 1yr average  2yr average 
 trend adjusted DID   trend adjusted Triple DID  trend adjusted DID   trend adjusted Triple DID 
  Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value 
Total                
CCI 0, 1 -0.048 0.166 0.7734  ref.    
0.186 0.241 0.4386 
 
ref.   
CCI  2, 3 -0.025 0.221 0.9090  0.072 0.146 0.6202  
0.231 0.292 0.4298 
 
0.041 0.203 0.8396 
CCI  ≥4 0.404 0.248 0.1037  0.456 0.222 0.0404  
0.939 0.329 0.0043 
 
0.678 0.300 0.0236 
Appendectomy         
   
 
   
CCI 0, 1 -0.069 0.188 0.7143  ref.    
0.118 0.275 0.6691 
 
   
CCI  2, 3 0.072 0.255 0.7778  0.155 0.177 0.3806  
0.143 0.324 0.6582 
 
0.007 0.227 0.9763 
CCI  ≥4 0.212 0.556 0.7030  0.250 0.550 0.6499  
0.843 0.686 0.2191 
 
0.494 0.690 0.4738 
Hernia procedures         
   
 
   
CCI 0, 1 0.070 0.250 0.7806  ref.    
0.594 0.258 0.0210 
 
ref.   
CCI  2, 3 0.218 0.303 0.4710  0.195 0.259 0.4515  
0.753 0.364 0.0384 
 
0.329 0.326 0.3127 
CCI  ≥4 0.461 0.302 0.1269  0.477 0.291 0.1014  
0.887 0.420 0.0345 
 
0.573 0.346 0.0978 
Hemorrhoid procedures         
   
 
   
CCI 0, 1 -0.092 0.324 0.7775  ref.    
0.219 0.442 0.6203 
 
ref.   
CCI  2, 3 -0.285 0.406 0.4830  0.001 0.253 0.9961  
-0.088 0.582 0.8794 
 
-0.197 0.381 0.6061 
CCI  ≥4 0.133 0.434 0.7599   0.530 0.355 0.1362   0.639 0.695 0.3581   0.501 0.501 0.3179 
Part of Appendectomy         
   
    
CCI  0, 1 0.139 0.135 0.3018  ref.    
0.396 0.197 0.0443 
 
ref. 
  
CCI  2, 3 0.371 0.208 0.0744  0.225 0.1546 0.1461  
0.289 0.263 0.2718 
 -0.038 0.215 0.859 
CCI  ≥4 0.755 0.535 0.1587   0.762 0.4503 0.0907   0.804 0.598 0.1787   0.755 0.592 0.202 
*Sub-DRG: R082, R084 
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Table S10. LOS change effects from results of CITS analysis and trend adjusted triple DID by hospital type subgroup 
 1yr average  2yr average 
 trend adjusted DID   trend adjusted Triple DID  trend adjusted DID   trend adjusted Triple DID 
  Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value 
Total                
General hospital -0.177 0.383 0.6433  0.832 0.4075 0.0412  0.266 0.523 0.6109  0.904 0.4663 0.0525 
Hospital -0.417 0.452 0.3557  ref.    
-0.184 0.294 0.5327 
 
ref. 
  
Appendectomy                
General hospital 0.117 0.221 0.5949  0.664 0.4956 0.1807  
0.642 0.296 0.0298 
 
0.670 0.4527 0.1389 
Hospital -0.574 0.481 0.2328  ref.    -0.206 0.261 0.4307  ref.   
Hernia procedures                
General hospital 0.056 0.197 0.7763  0.327 0.5156 0.5261  0.254 0.283 0.3700  0.283 0.5956 0.6342 
Hospital 1.651 1.303 0.2050  ref.    0.843 0.793 0.2881  ref.   
Hemorrhoid procedures                
General hospital 0.079 0.179 0.6600  1.524 0.5477 0.0054  0.367 0.254 0.1478  1.661 0.8378 0.0474 
Hospital -1.183 0.438 0.0069   ref.       -1.027 0.636 0.1059   ref.     
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Table S11. LOS change effects from results of CITS analysis and trend adjusted triple DID by region subgroup 
 1yr average  2yr average 
 trend adjusted DID   trend adjusted Triple DID  trend adjusted DID   trend adjusted Triple DID 
  Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value 
Total                
Urban -0.330 0.212 0.1194  ref.    
0.182 0.347 0.5999 
 
ref.   
Rural 0.241 0.217 0.2669  0.516 0.295 0.0796  
0.372 0.321 0.2460 
 
0.164 0.462 0.7225 
Appendectomy                
Urban -0.147 0.295 0.6185  ref.    
0.290 0.362 0.4233 
 
ref.   
Rural 0.138 0.245 0.5746  0.224 0.367 0.5418  
0.255 0.355 0.4732 
 
-0.068 0.505 0.8937 
Hernia procedures                
Urban -0.097 0.163 0.5547  ref.    
1.008 0.511 0.0486 
 
ref.   
Rural 0.196 0.278 0.4821  0.082 0.364 0.8224  
0.388 0.334 0.2465 
 
-0.898 0.632 0.1555 
Hemorrhoid procedures                
Urban -1.672 0.556 0.0027  ref.    
-1.578 0.770 0.0405 
 
ref.   
Rural 0.418 0.305 0.1705   2.147 0.644 0.0009   0.604 0.436 0.1658   2.326 0.884 0.0085 
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Table S12. LOS change effects from results of CITS analysis and trend adjusted triple DID by Teaching status subgroup 
 1yr average  2yr average 
 trend adjusted DID   trend adjusted Triple DID  trend adjusted DID   trend adjusted Triple DID 
  Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value 
Total                
Teaching -0.434 0.254 0.0880  ref.    -0.270 0.409 0.5092  ref.   
Non-teaching 0.207 0.189 0.2737  0.607 0.320 0.0580  0.502 0.271 0.0637  0.751 0.483 0.1195 
Appendectomy                
Teaching -0.382 0.341 0.2630  ref.    -0.199 0.547 0.7156  ref.   
Non-teaching 0.142 0.218 0.5137  0.470 0.414 0.2566  0.345 0.301 0.2523  0.530 0.627 0.3975 
Hernia procedures                
Teaching -0.322 0.239 0.1779  ref.    0.070 0.357 0.8447  ref.   
Non-teaching 0.527 0.263 0.0450  0.738 0.377 0.0500  1.167 0.341 0.0006  1.002 0.506 0.0479 Hemorrhoid procedures                Teaching -1.073 0.975 0.2707  ref.    -1.103 1.161 0.3423  ref.   Non-teaching 0.126 0.302 0.6754  1.052 1.055 0.3190  0.567 0.410 0.1668  1.668 1.358 0.2194 
71 
Appendix F. Predicted LOS change effects from results of the segmented 
regression analysis with control 
 
 
Table S13. Predicted LOS change effects from results of the segmented regression analysis 
with control for LOS 
  Trend adjusted difference   Trend adjusted 
Difference in Difference   Case   Control   
  Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE 
p-
value   Estimate SE 
p-
value 
12th month point                       
Total 0.210 0.175 0.2298   -0.193 0.110 0.0792   0.162 0.201 0.4210 
Appendectomy 0.200 0.222 0.3691   -0.078 0.145 0.5883   0.065 0.229 0.7772 
Hernia procedures 0.434 0.286 0.1300   0.123 0.213 0.5659   0.525 0.243 0.0306 
Hemorrhoid procedures 0.037 0.296 0.8996   -0.193 0.110 0.0792   0.042 0.395 0.9150 
24th month point                       
Total 0.548 0.306 0.0736   -0.180 0.174 0.3013   0.465 0.287 0.1052 
Appendectomy 0.504 0.380 0.1844   -0.184 0.273 0.5002   0.311 0.326 0.3391 
Hernia procedures 1.043 0.579 0.0715   0.336 0.356 0.3451   0.999 0.358 0.0052 
Hemorrhoid procedures 0.220 0.465 0.6357   -0.364 0.225 0.1056   0.302 0.564 0.5923 
36th month point                       
Total 0.886 0.449 0.0486   -0.262 0.265 0.3228   0.769 0.386 0.0460 
Appendectomy 0.808 0.550 0.1413   -0.289 0.406 0.4763   0.558 0.437 0.2021 
Hernia procedures 1.653 0.891 0.0636   0.549 0.515 0.2871   1.473 0.506 0.0036 
Hemorrhoid procedures 0.403 0.656 0.5387   -0.535 0.348 0.1240   0.562 0.752 0.4549 
48th month point                       
Total 1.506 0.719 0.0361   -0.412 0.434 0.3431   1.326 0.576 0.0213 
Appendectomy 1.367 0.869 0.1157   -0.482 0.654 0.4604   1.010 0.655 0.1233 
Hernia procedures 2.771 1.474 0.0601   0.939 0.820 0.2522   2.341 0.803 0.0035 
Hemorrhoid procedures 0.739 1.022 0.4698   -0.848 0.577 0.1414   1.039 1.114 0.3510 
Part of Appendectomy*                       
12th month point 0.187 0.148 0.2070   -0.018 0.110 0.8697   0.316 0.162 0.0515 
24th month point 0.392 0.264 0.1374   -0.016 0.225 0.9435   0.575 0.236 0.0150 
36th month point 0.597 0.398 0.1334   -0.014 0.345 0.9679   0.834 0.330 0.0115 
48th month point 0.973 0.653 0.1365   -0.010 0.567 0.9858   1.309 0.517 0.0113 
*Sub-DRG: R082, R084 
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Figure S3. Predicted LOS change effects from results of the segmented regression analysis with 
control for LOS 
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Table S14. Predicted LOS change effects from results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS by CCI subgroup 
 12th month point  24th month point  36th month point  48th month point 
  Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value 
Total                
CCI 0, 1 0.073 0.198 0.7133  
0.328 0.281 0.2426 
 
0.584 0.376 0.1202 
 
1.053 0.560 0.0602 
CCI  2, 3 0.113 0.249 0.6508  
0.426 0.349 0.2216 
 
0.740 0.471 0.1161 
 
1.315 0.715 0.0658 
CCI  ≥4 0.710 0.281 0.0114  
1.420 0.414 0.0006 
 
2.129 0.574 0.0002 
 
3.430 0.890 0.0001 
Appendectomy     
   
   
 
   
 
CCI 0, 1 0.031 0.225 0.8920  
0.261 0.322 0.4178 
 
0.491 0.432 0.2558 
 
0.913 0.646 0.1576 
CCI  2, 3 0.133 0.277 0.6313  
0.352 0.397 0.3750 
 
0.571 0.555 0.3037 
 
0.972 0.876 0.2668 
CCI  ≥4 0.829 0.396 0.0362  
1.494 0.786 0.0573 
 
2.415 1.039 0.0201 
 
4.103 1.572 0.0091 
Hernia procedures     
   
   
 
   
 
CCI 0, 1 0.328 0.225 0.1439  
0.728 0.316 0.0212 
 
1.128 0.471 0.0167 
 
1.861 0.797 0.0195 
CCI  2, 3 0.518 0.312 0.0966  
1.107 0.424 0.0090 
 
1.695 0.590 0.0040 
 
2.773 0.937 0.0031 
CCI  ≥4 0.710 0.341 0.0374  
1.221 0.520 0.0188 
 
1.731 0.738 0.0190 
 
2.667 1.167 0.0223 
Hemorrhoid procedures     
   
   
 
   
 
CCI 0, 1 0.056 0.378 0.8818  
0.313 0.534 0.5581 
 
0.570 0.711 0.4233 
 
1.041 1.055 0.3239 
CCI  2, 3 -0.195 0.482 0.6856  
-0.049 0.682 0.9431 
 
0.098 0.905 0.9140 
 
0.366 1.338 0.7843 
CCI  ≥4 0.439 0.538 0.4144   1.234 0.879 0.1604   2.028 1.283 0.1139   3.484 2.064 0.0914 
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Figure S4. Predicted LOS change effects from results of the segmented regression analysis with 
control for LOS by CCI subgroup 
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Table S15. Predicted LOS change effects from results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS by hospital type subgroup 
 12th month point  24th month point  36th month point  48th month point 
  Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value 
Total                
General hospital 
0.232 0.210 0.2703 
 
0.589 0.307 0.0550 
 
0.947 0.420 0.0243 
 
1.602 0.641 0.0125 
Hospital -0.322 0.339 0.3432  
-0.240 0.439 0.5841 
 
-0.159 0.639 0.8034 
 
-0.010 1.079 0.9924 
Appendectomy                
General hospital 0.165 0.232 0.4755  
0.448 0.337 0.1843 
 
0.730 0.462 0.1140 
 
1.248 0.707 0.0773 
Hospital 
-0.400 0.370 0.2798 
 
-0.108 0.355 0.7610 
 
0.184 0.466 0.6928 
 
0.720 0.809 0.3733 
Hernia procedures                
General hospital 
0.389 0.230 0.0904 
 
0.911 0.363 0.0121 
 
1.432 0.539 0.0079 
 
2.388 0.888 0.0072 
Hospital 1.214 1.108 0.2733  
-0.286 1.127 0.7995 
 
-1.786 1.245 0.1513 
 
-4.536 1.637 0.0056 
Hemorrhoid procedures                
General hospital 0.024 0.437 0.9555  
0.386 0.611 0.5276 
 
0.747 0.817 0.3603 
 
1.409 1.224 0.2496 
Hospital -1.132 0.490 0.0208   -1.182 0.744 0.1122   -1.231 1.018 0.2265   -1.322 1.537 0.3896 
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Figure S5. Predicted LOS change effects from results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS by hospital type subgroup 
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Table S16. Predicted LOS change effects from results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS by region subgroup 
 12th month point  24th month point  36th month point  48th month point 
  Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value 
Total                
Urban -0.070 0.271 0.7954  
0.472 0.421 0.2621 
 
1.014 0.585 0.0827 
 
2.009 0.895 0.0248 
Rural 0.316 0.263 0.2293  
0.514 0.388 0.1853 
 
0.713 0.531 0.1794 
 
1.077 0.807 0.1819 
Appendectomy                
Urban 0.081 0.321 0.8015  
0.609 0.421 0.1481 
 
1.137 0.542 0.0359 
 
2.105 0.786 0.0074 
Rural 0.203 0.291 0.4867  
0.366 0.422 0.3858 
 
0.529 0.574 0.3573 
 
0.828 0.873 0.3431 
Hernia procedures                
Urban 0.507 0.331 0.1259  
1.268 0.601 0.0348 
 
2.029 0.887 0.0221 
 
3.425 1.421 0.0159 
Rural 0.324 0.292 0.2678  
0.677 0.430 0.1155 
 
1.031 0.613 0.0925 
 
0.016 0.016 0.3096 
Hemorrhoid procedures                
Urban -1.623 0.653 0.0129  
-1.522 1.024 0.1372 
 
-1.420 1.446 0.3261 
 
-1.233 2.257 0.5848 
Rural 0.518 0.350 0.1390   0.729 0.500 0.1443   0.941 0.681 0.1669   1.328 1.039 0.2013 
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Figure S6. Predicted LOS change effects from results of the segmented regression analysis with 
control for LOS by region subgroup 
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Table S17. Predicted LOS change effects from results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS by teaching status subgroup 
 12th month point  24th month point  36th month point  48th month point 
  Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value   Estimate SE p-value 
Total                
Teaching -0.348 0.327 0.2872  
-0.139 0.492 0.7770 
 
0.069 0.669 0.9178 
 
0.451 1.005 0.6535 
Non-teaching 0.363 0.222 0.1014  
0.718 0.329 0.0290 
 
1.073 0.455 0.0183 
 
1.724 0.701 0.0139 
Appendectomy                
Teaching -0.284 0.441 0.5190  
-0.019 0.651 0.9771 
 
0.247 0.869 0.7764 
 
0.733 1.276 0.5655 
Non-teaching 0.254 0.247 0.3029  
0.525 0.353 0.1378 
 
0.795 0.488 0.1036 
 
1.290 0.758 0.0889 
Hernia procedures                
Teaching -0.129 0.254 0.6116  
0.145 0.438 0.7407 
 
0.419 0.676 0.5357 
 
0.921 1.142 0.4200 
Non-teaching 0.864 0.283 0.0023  
1.525 0.428 0.0004 
 
2.187 0.616 0.0004 
 
3.399 0.989 0.0006 
Hemorrhoid procedures                
Teaching -1.218 1.001 0.2240  
-1.971 1.296 0.1283 
 
-2.725 1.727 0.1148 
 
-4.106 2.647 0.1209 
Non-teaching 0.346 0.344 0.3136   0.813 0.475 0.0868   1.280 0.635 0.0438   2.136 0.956 0.0254 
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Figure S7. Predicted LOS change effects from results of the segmented regression analysis with 
control for LOS by teaching status subgroup 
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Table S18. Results of the segmented regression analysis with control for LOS according to distributions 
Parameter 
Normal    Negative binomial   Poisson 
Estimate p-value   Estimate p-value   Estimate p-value 
Total         Intercept b 3.164 <.0001 
 
2.808 <.0001 
 
2.808 <.0001 
Baseline trend -0.002 0.5827 
 
-0.002 0.6016 
 
-0.002 0.6016 
Level change -0.012 0.8450 
 
-0.032 0.5957 
 
-0.032 0.5957 
Trend change -0.004 0.5877 
 
-0.003 0.6360 
 
-0.003 0.6360 
Difference between case and control 0.186 0.4872 
 
0.245 0.3828 
 
0.245 0.3828 
Baseline trend of difference between case and control -0.007 0.0412 
 
-0.007 0.0324 
 
-0.007 0.0324 
Level change of difference between case and control -0.117 0.4366 
 
-0.073 0.6353 
 
-0.073 0.6353 
Trend change of difference between case and control 0.025 0.0055 
 
0.025 0.0053 
 
0.025 0.0053 
Appendectomy         Intercept b 5.551 <.0001 
 
5.416 <.0001 
 
5.416 <.0001 
Baseline trend -0.002 0.6720 
 
-0.001 0.7403 
 
-0.001 0.7403 
Level change 0.037 0.6222 
 
0.033 0.6066 
 
0.033 0.6066 
Trend change -0.004 0.6151 
 
-0.003 0.6950 
 
-0.003 0.6950 
Difference between case and control 0.042 0.8598 
 
0.033 0.8839 
 
0.033 0.8839 
Baseline trend of difference between case and control -0.005 0.2680 
 
-0.004 0.2296 
 
-0.004 0.2296 
Level change of difference between case and control -0.161 0.3595 
 
-0.114 0.4806 
 
-0.114 0.4806 
Trend change of difference between case and control 0.021 0.0496 
 
0.021 0.0313 
 
0.021 0.0313 
Hernia procedures         Intercept b 0.762 0.3051 
 
0.990 0.1103 
 
0.990 0.1103 
Baseline trend -0.017 0.0376 
 
-0.014 0.0433 
 
-0.014 0.0433 
Level change -0.129 0.3862 
 
-0.129 0.3635 
 
-0.129 0.3635 
Trend change 0.012 0.3480 
 
0.005 0.6379 
 
0.005 0.6379 
Difference between case and control -0.131 0.7472 
 
-0.152 0.7230 
 
-0.152 0.7230 
Baseline trend of difference between case and control -0.015 0.0033 
 
-0.013 0.0094 
 
-0.013 0.0094 
Level change of difference between case and control 0.091 0.6772 
 
0.080 0.7157 
 
0.080 0.7157 
Trend change of difference between case and control 0.040 0.0058 
 
0.039 0.0030 
 
0.039 0.0030 
Hemorrhoid procedures         Intercept b 2.734 <.0001 
 
2.733 <.0001 
 
2.733 <.0001 
Baseline trend 0.006 0.3373 
 
0.004 0.5004 
 
0.004 0.5004 
Level change -0.011 0.9071 
 
-0.025 0.7547 
 
-0.025 0.7547 
Trend change -0.012 0.1837 
 
-0.007 0.4309 
 
-0.007 0.4309 
Difference between case and control 0.646 0.0800 
 
0.712 0.0398 
 
0.712 0.0398 
Baseline trend of difference between case and control -0.010 0.1027 
 
-0.010 0.1120 
 
-0.010 0.1120 
Level change of difference between case and control -0.196 0.4914 
 
-0.130 0.6509 
 
-0.130 0.6509 
Trend change of difference between case and control 0.022 0.2072 
 
0.023 0.1796 
 
0.023 0.1796 
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Korean Abstract 
 
포괄지불제도의 변화가 외과 입원 환자의 재원일수에 미친 영향 
 - 포괄수가제에서 신포괄수가제로의 변화를 중심으로 
 
  
서론: 지불제도는 공급자의 행태에 영향을 끼쳐, 의료비를 조절하는 수단으로 쓰인다. 한국에서는 
2002년 7개 질병군에 대해 선택적으로 포괄수가제를 시행하였으며, 2013년 7월부터 해당 질병군에 
대해 전면 시행하였다. 한편 신포괄수가제는 2012년 7월부터 지역거점 공공병원과 보험자병원에
서 550개 질병군에 대해 시행하고 있다. 
연구목적: 이 연구의 목적은 신포괄수가제의 시행이 외과 질병군 입원환자의 재원일수에 미친 영
향을 평가하고, 이를 통해 적절한 지불 제도 개발을 위한 근거를 제시하는 것이다. 
연구방법: 2007년 1월부터 2012년 6월까지 포괄수가제를 시행하다가 2012년 7월부터 2014년 6월까
지 신포괄수가제를 시행한 병원에서 외과계 질병군인 맹장수술, 탈장수술, 항문수술로 입원한 
36,240건을 실험군으로 선정하였으며, 2007년 1월부터 2014년 6월까지 지속적으로 포괄수가제를 
시행한 병원과 종합병원에 동일 질병군으로 입원한 사람 중 Propensity Score Matching을 통해 
72,480건을 대조군으로 선정하여 연구대상으로 포함하였다. Propensity Score Matching은 개인수준에
서 나이, 성별, Charlson Comorbidity Index, 세부질병군 그리고 입원 날짜(월)을 매칭하여 이루어졌
다. baseline의 재원일수 변화 경향과 제도 외적 효과를 제거하고 제도 도입으로 인한 영향만을 평
가하기 위해 Segmented Regression Analysis in Interrupted Time Series Analysis 방법을 사용하였다.  
연구결과: Segmented Regression Analysis in Interrupted Time Series Analysis 결과 포괄수가제에서 신포
괄수가제 시행으로 시행 시점에서 재원일수가 0.007일 감소하였고, 재원일수의 증가 경향이 유의
하게 나타났다 (0.025일/달). 이러한 재원일수 증가 경향은 맹장수술에서 0.021일/달 탈장수술에서 
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0.040일/달로 유의하였으며, 항문수술에서는 유의한 증가경향을 보이지 않았다.  
Sub-group을 층화분석 한 결과, 중증도가 높은 그룹 일수록 더 가파른 재원일수 증가 경향을 보였
으며, 이는 맹장수술과 탈장수술에서도 유의하게 보였다. 또, 종합병원에서 통계적으로 유의하게 
재원일수 증가 경향을 보였고, 병원급에서는 유의한 변화를 보이지 않았다. 
추가적으로 시행한 Comparative Interrupted Time Series analysis 분석 결과, 신포괄수가제 시행으로 인
해 탈장수술에서 시행 2년째에 재원일수가 0.768일 증가하였다. 맹장수술 중 일부(복잡한 주진단
의 제외한 경우)에 대해서 시행 2년째 재원일수가 0.402일 증가하였으며, 시행 24개월째 재원일수
가 0.644일 증가하였다. Trend Adjusted Triple Difference-In-Difference analysis 분석 결과, 신포괄수가제 
시행으로 대조군과의 차이에 대한 경향이 월 0.025일 증가하게 변하였다. 이러한 차이는 맹장수술
(0.021일)과 탈장수술(0.040일)에서 있었으며 항문수술에서는 나타나지 않았다. Sub-group 분석에서 
Trend Adjusted Triple Difference-In-Difference analysis 분석 결과, 신포괄수가제 시행으로 인해 중증도
가 높은 그룹(CCI≥4)이 중증도가 낮은 그룹(CCI=0 ,1)보다 재원일수의 증가가 0.678일 더 있었다.  
결론: 이 연구는 포괄수가제에서 신포괄수가제로의 지불제도 변화가 외과 입원환자의 재원일수에 
미친 영향을 평가하였으며, 더 복잡한 수술이나 더 중증도가 높은 입원에서 재원일수가 증가 된 
결과를 보였다. 두 포괄지불제도 모두 재원일수를 줄이는 인센티브를 갖지만, 포괄수가제가 신포
괄수가제 보다 더 강력한 인센티브를 갖고, 이것이 한국 상황에서는 중증 환자 등의 경우에서 다
소 지나칠 수 있다고 생각된다.  
신의료기술의 발전과 고령화 등으로 지속적인 의료비 증가가 예상되는 가운데, 포괄 지불제도가 
이에 대한 대안으로 검토되고 있지만, 한국은 단일 보험자로 단일 지불제도를 사용하므로 지불제
도의 변경에 있어서 여러 가지 검토를 기반으로 한 신중한 선택과 개발이 있어야 할 것이다. 그
러므로 지불제도의 변경에 있어서 의료자원 사용의 감소나 재원일수의 감소뿐 만 아니라 한국의 
사정에 맞는 정확한 지불에 대한 고려를 해야 할 것을 제안한다.  
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